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CAPITALISM, SOCIAL MARGINALITY, AND THE
RULE OF LAW'S UNCERTAIN FATE IN MODERN
SOCIETY
Ahmed A. Whitet
ABSTRACT: The rule of law is liberalism's key juridical aspiration. Yet its
norms, centered on the principles of legality and legal generality, are being
compromised all over the political and legal landscape. For decades, the
dominant explanation of this worrying condition has focused mainly on the
rise of the welfare state and its apparent incompatibility with the rule of
law. But this approach, though shared by a politically diverse range of
scholars, is outdated and misconceives the problem. A central function of
the modem state has always been to prevent capitalism's inherent
tendencies toward social marginalization from devolving into general
social crisis. This involves prosecuting an agenda of social control aimed at
the socially marginalized. For much of the twentieth century, the welfare
state represented the dominant means by which the American state
advanced this agenda. While not unproblematic, the welfare state's reign in
this regard proved at least relatively compatible with the rule of law. Over
the last three decades, though, the state's primary means of responding to
the problem of marginality has shifted substantially, away from the welfare
state toward a reliance on the criminal justice system and its institutions to
advance this agenda. This shift in the dynamics of social control,
originating in both ideology and political economy, is evident in the
retrenchment of the welfare state and in concurrent changes in the nature of
criminal justice that reflect its growing concern with regulating social
marginality. This process is central to understanding the rule of law's fate
in modem society, as it has accorded to the criminal justice system
functions that render adherence to rule of law norms increasingly untenable
in this most important of contexts. This argument not only refocuses the
debate about the rule of law's fate; it also challenges the entrenched view of
the relationship between the rule of law and the welfare state and,
ironically, given the rule of law's origins in capitalism, it recasts capitalism
itself as the more fundamental problem for the rule of law in modem
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society. For it is in capitalism that both social marginality and the state's
underlying impulse to control this phenomenon are based.
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 760
II. THE RULE OF LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY .............................................. 763
A. Defining the Rule of Law ................................................................ 763
B. The Welfare State and the Rule of Law .......................................... 768
III. THE STATE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF MARGINALITY IN
M ODERN SOCIETY ................................................................................. 778
A. Social Control and the Social Welfare System ............................... 781
B. Social Control and the Criminal Justice System ............................ 786
1. Punishm ent and Surplus labor ................................................... 790
2. Labor Discipline and Social Marginality .................................. 795
3. Policing and the Control of the Lower Classes ......................... 799
IV. THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE RULE
OF LAW'S FATE IN MODERN SOCIETY ................................................... 801
A. The Relationship between the Social Welfare System and the
Criminal Justice System as Modes of Social Control .................... 802
B. The Retrenchment of the Social Welfare System ........................... 803
C. The Transformation of the Criminal Justice System and the
Erosion of the Rule of Law ............................................................. 809
D. The Shift in the Dominant Mode of Social Control and its Causes 814
1. The Social Control of Marginality in the Age of Social
W elfare Retrenchm ent ............................................................... 815
2. Explaining the Changing Dynamics of Social Control:
Neo-Liberalism, the Transformation of Capitalism, and
the Fiscal Crisis of the State ...................................................... 819
E. The Inexorable Logic of Social Control and the Rule of
Law 's Fate in M odern Society ....................................................... 826
V . C ONCLU SION ......................................................................................... 829
I. INTRODUCTION
The rule of law, which consists fundamentally of the aspiration to limit
and rationalize sovereignty by aligning it with the principles of legal
generality and legality, is the key juridical aspiration of liberalism.
Conceived in such terms, which go beyond its often trivialized construction
in popular rhetoric, the rule of law has never reigned supreme in American
life. At some points its agenda has advanced impressively and can be found
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ingrained in law and practice. But just as often, the rule of law's history is
marked by the retreat of its norms and the rights that give them meaning or
by the failure to realize its aspirations in the first place.
The rule of law's uncertain fate in modem society is an important
concern of legal scholars, as it carries with it the threat of illiberalism and
even authoritarianism. For almost all scholars who concern themselves with
the question, the construct's precarious condition reflects the corrosive
influence of the welfare state. Scholars of the rule of law across the political
spectrum, from F.A. Hayek to Roberto Unger, invariably point to the
welfare state's expansion of state sovereignty, its intervention in private
relationships, and its tendency for individualized and discretionary decision-
making, as undermining rule of law norms and even threatening to banish
the rule of law entirely from the political and legal landscape.1
This Article challenges this dominant perspective as outdated and
fundamentally wrong. It argues not only that the relationship between the
rule of law and the welfare state is more complicated than the adherents to
this "welfare thesis" acknowledge, but indeed that the retrenchment of the
welfare state does more to account for the rule of law's erosion than its
rather brief prominence ever did. This Article argues more broadly that the
rule of law's problematic condition in modern society reflects the
fundamental incompatibility of its claims with the realities of state power
and the ubiquity of social marginality in the context of contemporary
capitalism.
I build this argument around several central claims. Elaborating on the
insights of radical critics of the welfare state, I present the welfare state-
and in particular its constituent, the social welfare system-as
fundamentally concerned with the social control of endemic poverty,
chronic unemployment, and other expressions of social marginality in
modern, capitalist society. Its retrenchment, I then argue, has not entailed
the state's abandonment of this mission of asserting social control over the
socially marginalized, but rather the transfer of this function to the criminal
justice system as well as the incorporation into the vestiges of the social
welfare system of increasingly coercive and punitive criminal justice-like
motifs. In this context, the welfare state itself has become even more
offensive to rule of law norms than it was at its height; and more palpably,
the criminal justice system has taken on obligations increasingly
incompatible with the rule of law. Indeed, I argue that the steady
deterioration of rule of law norms in the criminal justice context, including
1. For a summary of this thesis, which will be explored in greater detail later in this
Article, see Bill Scheuerman, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State: Toward a New Synthesis,
22 POL. & SOC'Y 195, 199-203 (1994).
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the relentless erosion of civil liberties and the entrenchment of structural
inequalities and illegal practices, cannot be understood apart from the
demise of the welfare state.
This change in the dominant mode of social control has not unfolded in a
vacuum. It reflects several important developments in ideology and political
economy of the last several decades: the consolidation of neo-liberalism, the
onset of chronic fiscal crisis, and the persistence of deep social inequalities.
These developments, I argue, have both spurred the demise of the welfare
state and the transfer of its functions to the criminal justice system. They
have also exacerbated the conditions of social marginality and the
accompanying threats of criminality and social disorder that inform the
state's assertion of its agenda of social control in the first place. In the
course of developing this thesis, I also broach more basic and troubling
questions about the rule of law and its place in modem society. I attempt to
expose the limits that social structure and capitalism in particular impose on
the rule of law in modem society. Ironically, though essential to the
development of the rule of law, capitalism also emerges as an impediment
to its full realization.
This Article draws on the work of a number of scholars. Foremost
among these is the critical theorist Franz Neumann, who in the Mid-
twentieth century articulated a creative and very useful view of the rule of
law's condition in modem society. Elaborating on the likes of Marx and
Weber, Neumann developed a perspective on the rule of law that is
sensitive to the construct's historicity, its political connotations, and its
often contradictory relationship to capitalism. Unlike many rule of law
scholars, Neumann sensed that the rule of law's tenuous condition in
modem society reflects not so much the corrosive effects of the welfare
state or some other deviation from a "true" capitalism, but rather the
problematic nature of capitalism itself. On the dynamics of social control
under capitalism, I am indebted to an array of critical scholars. Regarding
the welfare state, these include James O'Connor, Claus Offe, and Frances
Fox Piven and Richard Cloward. Regarding social control and the criminal
justice system, I draw particularly on leftist critics like Dario Melossi, Lofc
Wacquant, and David Garland.
I develop this Article in several parts. With the construct's notorious
ambiguity in mind, Part II offers a coherent and meaningful definition of the
rule of law. It also describes the relationship between the rule of law and the
dynamics of class conflict and social marginality. It shows, in a preliminary
way, how this relationship colors the rule of law's connection to the welfare
state, to the criminal justice system, and to capitalism generally. Part III
proceeds in two sections. First, it describes the inherency of the state's
[Ariz. St. L.J.762
RULE OF LA W'S UNCERTAIN FATE
social control function, in particular as an institution for managing the
inevitable tendencies toward social crises in modem, capitalist society.
Second, this Part describes the social welfare system and the criminal
justice system as alterative modes of prosecuting this social control function
vis-A-vis the lower classes, on which the burdens of social marginality fall.
Part IV then describes the shift from the social welfare system to the
criminal justice system as the dominant mode of social control in
contemporary society and the forces that account for this shift. This Part
also demonstrates how this shift in social control has compelled the retreat
from rule of law norms of the last three decades. Part V is a conclusion in
which I discuss the troubling implications of this argument for the way we
understand the rule of law and the possibility of realizing its norms in
modem, capitalist society.
II. THE RULE OF LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY
Although an indispensable construct for comprehending the
interrelationship of state and society and the law's role in mediating this
relationship, the rule of law is saddled with a tendency to be construed in
sometimes simplistic, sometimes ambiguous, and typically uncritical terms.
This Part aims to transcend these habits, to set out a coherent and critical
definition of the rule of law, and to develop at least a preliminary
understanding of the construct's relationship to capitalism generally and to
the welfare state more specifically. In each of these undertakings,
Neumann's work figures prominently. While not unproblematic,
Neumann's critique features a rare tendency to grasp the rule of law's
conceptual meanings, its normative structure, as well as its complex,
contradictory trajectory within the political economy of capitalist society.
A. Defining the Rule of Law
Contemporary references to the rule of law, both scholarly and practical,
have a decidedly unhelpful habit of identifying the rule of law with the mere
existence of a legal order,2 with a regime of "free market" capitalism,3 or
2. On this approach to the rule of law and its limitations, see GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER,
THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOcRACY 11-14 (1988).
3. Among many possible examples of this use of the rule of law, see, for example,
Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 97-103 (1998); 0. Lee Reed,
Law, the Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for the Private Market and Business Study,
38 AM. BUS. L.J. 441, 450-66 (2001); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and
Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 21-23 (2003).
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even with imperialist adventures of a patently illegal sort.4 The problem
with these constructions is that they reify the construct, making it simply
synonymous with existing political and economic formations and anathema
to others. Such constructions are fundamentally justificatory, not critical,
and offer little to illuminate the complexities of the rule of law's condition
in modern society.
The rule of law, as we shall see shortly, certainly has an ideological
component. But this ideological component is embedded in a larger project
of circumscribing the sovereignty of the modem state. Understood in this,
its classical orientation-for example, as by the likes of Locke, Rousseau,
and Montesquieu-the rule of law consists of a number of norms: that the
law define the limits of state sovereignty, and in so doing differentiate state
from civil society; that the law apply only prospectively, and not
retroactively; that the law be administered within a legal and political
system characterized by separation of powers and judicial independence;
and that the law assume a general form.5
For Neumann, legal generality, which he identifies with "an abstract rule
which does not mention particular cases or individually nominated persons,
but which is issued in advance to apply to all cases and all persons in the
abstract," is the most fundamental of the rule of law's constituent norms.
6
This is true in a number of ways. In the most basic sense, the demand for
generality both valorizes and formalizes law. It tends to separate law
institutionally from sovereignty and thereby to facilitate the rule of law's
most basic element: the principle of "legality," which entails the idea that
the law autonomously governs all, including the state itself. Only those acts
of the sovereign that are couched in law are valid, and only those laws that
are general in form are truly lawful. In this fashion, legal generality goes
4. For an account of this tendency, see generally Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New
Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of Law," 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275 (2003).
5. See JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
265, 355-63, 374-80 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 80-83 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968)
(1762); 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, B. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 160-96 (Thomas
Nugent trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1748); see also Franz L. Neumann, The Change
in the Function of Law in Modern Society, in THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE 101, 102-04
(William E. Scheuerman ed., 1996) [hereinafter Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law].
6. FRANz NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN
MODERN SOCIETY 213 (1986) [hereinafter NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW]. For this reason, legal
generality is the conceptual centerpiece of the rule of law's classical doctrinal iterations. Id. at
212-22; Franz L. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, in THE RULE OF LAW UNDER
SIEGE 195, 199 (William E. Scheuerman ed., 1996) [hereinafter Neumann, The Concept of
Political Freedom]. But cf JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 212-13 (1979) (arguing that both general and particular laws are necessary).
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quite a distance in setting limits to both the extent and the form of
sovereignty.7
Other important implications follow from legal generality. A regime of
general law implies judicial independence and with this, the separation of
powers. This is true in that a system of general laws "guarantees to the
judge a minimum of independence because it does not subordinate him to
the individual measures of the sovereign"-meaning it is logically difficult
for the sovereign to over-dictate to the judge where the judge's role consists
of enforcing general laws.8 Separation of powers also follows from legal
generality in that, if the law is to retain its generality, neither the law's
adjudication nor its administration can be in the hands of those who make
the laws in the first place; for this would allow the state to rule by individual
measures disguised as general laws.9 Similarly, legal generality requires that
the law be administered by judges and executive officials alike whose
discretion is itself limited by law; for excessive discretion inevitably
reduces formal, general rules to informal, individual measures.' ° Finally,
legal generality also precludes retroactive laws. Neumann's argument is
very straightforward: a "law which provides for retroactivity contains
particular commands inasmuch as the facts to which the law refers already
exist."1
For Neumann these implications of legal generality follow only from a
particular kind of generality, one that couches the law in specific, formal
statements. Only laws that are general in two convergent senses of the word
are truly consistent with the effective limitation of sovereignty: "[F]irst, law
must be a rule that does not mention particular cases or individual persons
but which is issued in advance to apply to all cases and all persons in the
abstract, and second, it must be specific, as specific as possible in view of
its general formulation."' 2 Such a definition of legal generality is essential
to distinguishing the rule of law from rule by "general principles,"
7. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 212.
8. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 107-08; cf. NEUMANN,
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 217-18.
9. See Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 118; Neumann,
The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 200; cf CARL SCHMrTT, LEGALITY AND
LEGITIMACY 70-71 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., Univ. Press 2004) (1932).
10. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 257; Neumann, The Change in the
Function of Law, supra note 5, at 113-15; cf Guido Pincione, Market Rights and the Rule of
Law: A Case for Procedural Constitutionalism, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 397, 400 (2003).
11. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 107; Neumann, The
Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 200. Carl Schmitt makes a similar argument in
his account of the features of the "legislative state." SCHMITr, supra note 9, at 3-4.
12. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 199.
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"standards of conduct," or other constructs that can easily conceal
individualized, discretionary, or retroactive acts of the sovereign. 3
Understood in this way, the rule of law is not normatively neutral; it
necessarily features a substantive juridical content. 4 This is true in the
broad sense that the very point of the rule of law and its most essential
implication is to limit the power of the state to that which it is allowed by
the law. In this fashion, the rule of law preserves to citizens or other
subjects a sphere of liberties from the state. 5 Because the state is
constrained to act only by law, it follows that "only behavior that is
expressly forbidden by law is punishable."' 6 The state must, moreover,
refrain from subjecting its citizens to measures that are individualized,
excessively discretionary, or retroactive. As Neumann argues, by denying
the state such prerogatives, generality presupposes a range of "negative"
freedoms "from the state" in the personal and economic spheres, political
freedom both within and from the state, and minimum freedoms of
association. 7
General legal rules presuppose as well formal equality under the law, in
both a personal and a political sense. For where the state is constrained to
articulate sovereignty in the form of general legal rules, the content of
13. What Neumann means is that laws lacking adequate specificity reserve so much
discretion to the state that they can only be "a mask under which individual measures are
hidden." Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 107. In order to
maintain true generality, "all essential facts" to which the law refers must be "clearly defined."
Id. at 107-08, 116.
14. See NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 8-9.
15. Id. at 32.
16. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 199-201.
17. See NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 212-14. Or to make this point
slightly differently, the general freedom from state interference that the rule of law secures
manifests itself in these four distinct contexts, and in these contexts, the principle of generality
prevents the state interfering except in a necessarily limited fashion. Neumann, The Change in
the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 107-08. Notably, these substantive normative implications
of the rule of law were also evident to Schmitt, who saw them as evidence of the rule of law's
contradictory and incoherent nature. In Schmitt's words, "[t]here is no middle road between the
principled value neutrality of the functionalist system of legality and the principled value
emphasis of the [Weimer Constitution's] substantive constitutional guarantees." SCHMrrr, supra
note 9, at 47. Personal freedoms entail privacy, freedom from arrest without process, freedom
from bills of attainder, and the like; political freedoms include freedom of association and
assembly, freedom of the press, and freedom from state interference with the content of political
views; economic freedoms involve freedom of private property, trade, and private investment;
and freedom of association in the labor context revolves around the right to organize labor
unions and to engage in collective bargaining and labor protests. These freedoms are not
absolute, but rather protected from interference outside the framework of law or in
contravention of the principle of generality. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law,
supra note 5, at 108; Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 197-200.
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sovereignty itself is limited to anonymous, abstract forms. In like fashion,
generality precludes the state denominating particular individuals (or
groups) for special treatment. 18 In Neumann's words, "[a] minimum of
equality is guaranteed, for if the lawmaker must deal with persons and
situations in the abstract he thereby treats persons and situations as equals
and is precluded from discriminating against any one specific person.',' 9
Neumann, whose inclinations occupied the uncertain ground between
reformism and radicalism, is careful to acknowledge the limited nature of
this normative agenda vis-a-vis the quest for true human emancipation,
which depends on much more than freedom from the state or formal
equality. In fact, as we shall see, Neumann appreciates that the rule of law
not only leaves intact class rule and exploitation, but it also lends support to
these institutions. But Neumann is quick to affirm that the rule of law's
negative freedoms and formal equality are significant all the same to the
cause of human emancipation. They are genuine, as far as they go, and they
perform the important "moral" or "ethical" function of validating the
demand for more meaningful changes. 0 In these respects, the rule of law
offers real benefits to the "working class and the poor" in the form of
limited securities from official persecution and an authentic, if quite
incomplete, form of equality.21
This essentially dialectical view of the rule of law represents a
perspective not unlike that of Marx himself, who, while recognizing the
limits of freedom under the modem legal system, was equally quick to
acknowledge this development as a "big step forward," one that constitutes
"the last form of human emancipation within the prevailing scheme of
things. 22 Whether associated with Neumann or Marx, such a view has great
value to any radical critique of the rule of law, in that it recognizes the
construct's positive aspects, both functionally and ideologically, while not
exaggerating these aspects or remaining blind to the rule of law's
problematic real-life consequences. And it sees these opposed tendencies
not as a reflection of the construct's conceptual incoherence, but rather as
reflective of its natural fate within a contradictory social structure. From
such a perspective, the rule of law is important to the question of human
emancipation in modem society, but in a historically contingent and not
18. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 117-18; Neumann,
The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 201, 206.
19. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 201.
20. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 33-37; Neumann, The Change in the
Function of Law, supra note 5, at 117-18.
21. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 121.
22. KARL MARX, On the Jewish Question, in KARL MARX: EARLY WRITINGS 211, 217-21
(Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans., Vintage Books 1975) (1843).
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unproblematic way. It is, to turn E.P. Thompson's familiar expression on
this matter, a distinctly qualified "good," but a good all the same.23
This contingency can be seen in another dimension of the rule of law. At
the same time that it limits sovereignty, the rule of law is also a partly
authoritarian construct. For in limiting sovereignty, the construct
demarcates a range of circumstances in which the exercise of sovereignty is
presumptively legitimate and in which freedom and equality must yield.
Indeed, Neumann is very clear that by embracing the rule of law, the liberal
state does not surrender so much as rationalize and validate its authority. In
accordance with this, "[t]he liberal state has always been as strong as the
political and social situation and the interests of society demanded .... It
has been a strong state precisely in those spheres in which it had to be
strong and in which it wanted to be strong."'24 These observations on the rule
of law's authoritarian dimensions are all the more significant given that the
rule of law also endorses the state's monopoly on coercion and tends to
abrogate any right of resistance to its properly constituted and articulated
21
sovereignty.
B. The Welfare State and the Rule of Law
For a diverse array of scholars, including not only Hayek and Unger, but
also the likes of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Jurgen Habermas, the rule
of law's relationship to capitalism is defined by two things: a unique
compatibility with liberal, competitive capitalism; and a fundamental
incompatibility with the welfare state, as well as with social democracy and
socialism. 26 The reasoning behind this "welfare thesis" entails several key
contentions. The initial claim is for a functional and historical symbiosis
between the rule of law and competitive, pre-welfare, capitalism.
Competitive capitalism requires the institutions of formal equality and
economic freedom as well as the overall limitation of state sovereignty that
23. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975).
24. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 101-03; cf NEUMANN,
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 198, 214.
25. This authoritarian feature is central to the rule of law's normative integrity, as it
prevents circumvention of the construct's stated normative ambitions. On this aspect of the rule
of law, see SCHMITT, supra note 9, at 18-19; Otto Kirchheimer, Legality and Legitimacy, in
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 130, 132 (Keith Tribe ed., Leena Tanner & Keith
Tribe trans., 1987).
26. By the "welfare state," I mean an array of institutions of which the social welfare
system is an important, but not exclusive constituent. Along with the social welfare system, the
welfare state consists also of various direct supports for corporations, including for example:
farm subsidies, research and development support, military contracts, and the like.
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the rule of law-and in particular its norm of legal generality-tends to
mandate. And the rule of law is said to prosper in such a context, realizing
its full potential as a check on state sovereignty without incurring much
conflict between its norms and the realities of political economy. The
advent of the welfare state, however, is said to upset this relationship. The
welfare state generally expands state sovereignty. More importantly, its
many interventions in civil society are typically premised upon individual
or "exceptional" decision-making on the basis of informal, ad hoc, vague,
sometimes retroactive, or otherwise non-general rules. Similarly, the
welfare state takes it upon itself to intervene in private affairs, redistributing
property, regulating contracts, and so forth. In other cases, the welfare state
entails the state itself acting as a privileged party in business or other
affairs. In all these habits, the welfare state runs afoul of the rule of law's
basic normative structure.27
For many neo-liberals, Hayek foremost among them, the charge that the
rule of law cannot prevail in the context of the welfare state counsels the
rejection of the welfare state and resurrection of competitive capitalism.28
Indeed, in Hayek's view, the logic of the welfare state, which is reflected in
its incompatibility with the rule of law, leads "straight to the totalitarian
state., 2 9 For many modem liberals and leftists, though, a different position
follows from this conflict. The rule of law's incompatibility with the
welfare state is said to expose the rule of law's reactionary character and to
show that the construct must be sacrificed to the interests of social justice.3"
In this vein, Unger, for example, concludes that:
[t]he rule of law is the liberal state's most emphatic response to the
problems of power and freedom. But we have seen that, whatever
its efficacy in preventing immediate government oppression of the
individual, the strategy of legalism fails to deal with these issues in
the basic relationships of work and everyday life.3'
27. Hayek is perhaps the most aggressive in laying out this critique of the welfare state.
For Hayek, the welfare state is fundamentally incompatible with a regime of formal, a priori
laws, in that it is built around informal, ad hoc decision making; it is inconsistent with formal
equality too, in that it involves the state intervening on the basis of individual need into the
domain of economic and civil affairs. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, xxiii, 80-96 (Univ.
Chicago Press 1994) (1944). This informs Hayek's opposition to the welfare state as an
indefensible affront to freedom, equality, and liberalism generally. Id. at 91; see also Harry W.
Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 150-52 (1958).
28. See, e.g., Pincione, supra note 10, at 401.
29. HAYEK, supra note 27, at 95-96.
30. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 59-61 (1987).
31. ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 238-42 (1976); cf BOB FINE,
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: LIBERAL IDEALS AND MARXIST CRITIQUES 111-21 (1984).
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Notably, it is not just leftists for whom conflict with the welfare state
demands the rule of law's repudiation. Another view, embodied in the work
of Schmitt, sees in the contradiction between the rule of law and the welfare
state an unveiling of the rule of law's fundamental incoherence.3 2 In
Schmitt's view, the rule of law is an immensely problematic construct. Its
legalism, which invokes the sovereignty of law, is an affront to what
Schmitt regards as the only true foundation of state legitimacy: an identity
of the state with "the people."33 Moreover, by displacing the issue of
legitimacy from politics to law, and by concealing sovereignty behind a veil
of neutrality, the rule of law abets the subversion of the state's legitimacy,
leaving it vulnerable to usurpation by its "enemies," and allowing the state's
capture by groups unconcerned with maintaining the integrity of the
political order (for Schmitt, a Nazi, this meant socialists and communists).34
And while these dynamics are endemic to the rule of law, they are
exacerbated by the discretionary, individualized, and altogether greater
exercises of sovereignty by the welfare state. All of this creates an
untenable condition that can only be cured by the rule of law's forceful
abandonment and its replacement with an authoritarian structure grounded
in "decisionism," "exceptionalism," and "general principles."35 The law
must exchange any pretense to restrain sovereignty by general rules for a
more straightforward mission of embracing the nature of sovereignty as it
exists.36 The essence of Schmitt's position, if not its convoluted and
32. See generally ScHMITr, supra note 9.
33. Id. at 23-25.
34. Id. at 28-35.
35. Schmitt's view of the rule of law bears a bit more elaboration. Schmitt essentially
identified in the rule of law an inherent function in concealing individualist, concrete features-
in his words, "decisionist" elements. These features prevailed even in the liberal state reigning
over competitive capitalism. But for Schmitt, such features are exacerbated by the rise of the
welfare state. In this context, the rule of law's norms create an aura of predictability and rule-
bound determinacy, which conceal a very different reality characterized more and more by
decisionist elements. For Schmitt, this condition invalidates the very construct of the rule of law
and requires its outright abandonment-if only, he argues, to preserve the integrity of the
political and legal order and to salvage legitimacy and determinacy. Id. at 20-24, 28-35, 70-71.
In this respect, Schmitt's approach reflects a tendency to normalize the rule of law's concrete,
empirical realities. It led him, infamously, to embrace Nazism. See DAVID DYZENHAUS,
LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL ScHMITr, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR
38-101 (1997); WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE ExCEPTION 10, 13-15
(1994).
36. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 104-05.
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reactionary precepts, is held by other scholars for whom the rule of law is
simply unable to actually restrain sovereignty.
3 7
Neumann's views on the rule of law's relationship to capitalism are
defined by his approach to the welfare thesis. For Neumann, the rule of
law's place in modem society is significantly more complex than this thesis
suggests. The construct's relationship to capitalism is not straightforward,
but fundamentally contradictory. Throughout their history together,
capitalism has been at times both consistent with and antithetical to rule of
law norms. In fact, Neumann is explicit in his view that the rule of law has
never been either stable or secure in capitalist society, and that the cause of
this inheres in the nature of capitalism.38 This perspective emerges
alongside-and in contrast to-his view of its "ethical" functions.39
Neumann acknowledges that the rule of law bears a close functional
relationship to capitalism. He endorses Marx's and Weber's insights that
capitalism demands a legal system that renders the state's behavior
predictable and economic conduct under the law, whether public or private,
calculable; for only under these conditions, which the rule of law provides,
is the efficient investment of capital possible. Likewise, a system of free
competition, which is a mainspring of capitalism's ideological agenda, and
which actually prevailed (more or less) during its early stages, broadly
requires economic freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law.n° In particular,
capitalist transactions benefit from the calculability and predictability
entailed in the rule of law's prohibition of retroactivity, its minimization of
discretion, its mandate of judicial independence, and its general tendency to
clarify the law's meaning.41
For Neumann though, the connection between capitalism and the rule of
law is also affected by class conflict. Again in line with Marx and Weber,
Neumann argues that the rule of law was a significant weapon in the
bourgeoisie's struggle to depose feudal and aristocratic rule. According to
this narrative, the rule of law's value to the bourgeoisie lay in its
condemnation of the typical forms of feudal and aristocratic rule-the
37. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TExT IN THIS CLASS: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980). See also various articles in 72 TELOS (1987) (special issue
on Carl Schmitt).
38. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 116-17.
39. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 201-05.
40. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 116-17; Neumann,
The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 201-05.
41. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 255-56; Neumann, Change in the
Function of Law, supra note 5, at 106, 109-12. A very similar claim is developed at some
length in MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 839-59 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1968).
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individual measure and the general principle. Likewise, the constellation of
personal, economic, and political freedoms that the rule of law emerged to
protect inured to the benefit of this then-insurgent class. Such freedoms
gave the bourgeoisie a degree of autonomy essential to the consolidation of
its social, political, and economic power. Similarly, the rule of law's
mandate for separation of powers not only diffused state power but also
redistributed power to the legislature, an institution in which the bourgeoisie
quickly attained great influence.42 With this power, the bourgeoisie could
not only protect its freedoms, but also begin an enduring practice of
retarding those social reforms with which it did not agree.43
For Neumann, these are not the rule of law's only functional supports for
capitalism or the bourgeoisie. The rule of law also performs what Neumann
variously calls a political or ideological function in obscuring the nature,
and at the same time legitimating the exercise, of state power in capitalist
society.44 Generality reifies the authority of the individuals and the classes
that actually dominate the state and wield hegemonic power in capitalist
society. In Neumann's words, the rule of law "veils the unwillingness of the
ruling classes to give way to social reforms," and it "disguis[es] the real
holders of power in the state., 45 Likewise, the rule of law tends to articulate
questions of freedom and equality in the language of state, as opposed to
private, sovereignty. "The invocation of the law as the sole sovereign and
the dictum that sovereignty is 'a government of laws and not of men' make
it superfluous to mention that, in reality, men do rule, even when they rule
within the framework of the law."46 This dynamic displaces from civil
society to the state modern society's failures to fully realize the
enlightenment ideals of freedom and equality on which its overall
legitimacy is ostensibly based-at the same time that it insulates private
actors from responsibility on this question, and further impedes the quest
for human emancipation.
42. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 213; Neumann, The Concept of
Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 201-02.
43. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 115, 122-32.
44. On this point, Neumann's position is in line with that of Weber and Neumann's
colleague, Otto Kirchheimer, for whom the principle of legality and the rule of law construct are
fundamental to the legitimation of the modem, post-feudal state. Kirchheimer, supra note 25, at
130.
45. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 115; see also
NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 213, 254-55; Neumann, The Concept of
Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 202-03; cf. JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGIriMATION CRISIS 21-
24 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1975) (1973).
46. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 115.
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For Neumann, consistency between capitalism and the rule of law was
indeed particularly evident during the reign of competitive, liberal
capitalism. This economic system, which featured many relatively equal
competitors, placed relatively little pressure on the rule of law to yield to
individual measures that worked to the direct advantage of individual
capitalists.47 It was likewise free of much in the way of direct state
interventions of the kind that expand the domain of sovereignty and
challenge the law's generality and its commitment to formal equality.48 At
the same time, the sphere of economic freedom created by the rule of law
was especially consistent with the realities of competitive capitalism and the
(relatively) non-interventionist state.49
Unlike most rule of law scholars, though (Schmitt perhaps excepted),5"
Neumann acknowledges a number of more fundamental tensions between
capitalism and the rule of law that transcend the distinction between the
liberal and the welfare state. These tensions take several forms. In its
ideological functions, the rule of law conceals real conflicts. Formal
equality belies real social inequality; and the negative freedoms that are
conveyed by the rule of law obscure the lack of genuine freedom in
society.51 Moreover, the rule of law conceals the political function of law in
society-at the same time that it restrains this function.52 The power that the
rule of law veils is not only that of the state, but that of capital, which is
protected by the veiling function of the rule of law from consideration as an
impediment to freedom and equality.53 Even more problematically, the rule
of law's support for capitalism perpetuates the very social realities that
create these inconsistencies between rule of law norms and social reality.
Neumann recognizes these features even within liberal, competitive
capitalism.
It is precisely because of these endemic inconsistencies between the rule
of law and capitalism that Neumann rejects the view of the welfare state-
47. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 205.
48. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 217, 255-57.
49. Neumann notes that such freedoms are not protected by the rule of law "for their own
sake," but rather because they essentially represent the inherent meaning of economic liberty at
this point in history. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 109.
50. Schmitt's critique of the rule of law simultaneously (and somewhat confusingly) draws
on both the construct's practical, historical incoherence in the context of the welfare state and
the sense that social conflict of a more endemic sort threatens the coherence of rule of law
norms. Scl-Mrrr, supra note 9, at 27-30. In the latter regard, Schmitt is especially concerned
that the rule of law might facilitate the ascendance of a working class majority over minority
interests. Id. at 31.
51. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 197.
52. Id. at 202-03.
53. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 213.
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especially the social welfare system as a distinct component of the welfare
state-as fundamentally antithetical to the rule of law. Neumann does not
quarrel with the view of the welfare state as inconsistent with legal
generality-at least on a superficial level. But unlike adherents to the
welfare thesis, Neumann also sees in the welfare state the potential to better
realize the rule of law. 4 And he does not, in any case, think it either
possible or desirable to go back to a system of liberal, competitive
capitalism.55
This unorthodox view of the relationship between the welfare state and
the rule of law follows from several other contentions. At its base is a
simple recognition that increases in government regulation are not
necessarily corrosive of the rule of law's norms. What determines the nature
of the relationship is "each concrete situation," as the exercise of
sovereignty is fully capable of either advancing or compromising the rule of
law's normative structures.56 Indeed, Neumann clearly qualifies his view of
the rule of law as a benefit to the poor and working class by recognizing
that lack of access to the machinery of law and the state-a deficiency that
the (social) welfare state alone among legal regimes has substantially
mitigated-compromises the realization of rule of law norms.57 Moreover,
the state does not constitute the only enemy of freedom: "private social
power can be even more dangerous to liberty than public power. The
intervention of the state with respect to private power positions may be vital
to secure liberty. 5 8 For, "[t]he nonintervention of the state in a capitalist
society means, in truth, intervention in favour of the ruling class."59 In other
words, Neumann sees in the welfare state not just juridical conflict with the
rule of law, but a parallel potential to remedy gross social inequalities that
54. This aspect of Neumann's philosophy is very well described by William Scheuerman.
See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 35, at 43-55. Neumann appears to have believed more strongly in
the positive features of the welfare state in his younger years than he did later in life. Claus
Offe, The Problem of Social Power in Franz L Neumann's Thought, 10 CONSTELLATIONS 211,
211, 222-23 (2003) [hereinafter Offe, The Problem of Social Power]. Neumann's view of the
relationship between the rule of law and the welfare state differs as well from that of Hans
Kelsen, who is more interested in denying any logical inconsistency between the welfare state
and the rule of law. See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy, ETHICS, Oct. 1955, at 1,
77-80.
55. On this aspect of Neumann's thought, see Offe, The Problem of Social Power, supra
note 54, at 219.
56. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 209.
57. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 121.
58. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 210.
59. Franz L. Neumann, The Social Significance of the Basic Laws of the Weimar
Constitution, in SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RuLE OF LAW 27, 40 (Keith Tribe ed., Leena
Tanner & Keith Tribe trans., 1987).
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themselves can pose a greater threat than the welfare state to the coherence
of a system of general laws.6 °
Not only is Neumann skeptical of the view that the welfare state spells
the death of the rule of law, but for him this is not even the most significant
threat. Neumann regards the rise of business monopolies as a development
that renders the rule of law least tenable in the long run.61 This development
opposes the rule of law in two ways. First, "[i]n a monopolistically
organized system the general law cannot be supreme. If the state is
confronted only by a monopoly, it is pointless to regulate this monopoly by
a general law. In such a case the individual measure is the only appropriate
expression of the sovereign power"-the only way to regulate monopolies.62
Neumann sees in the relationship between the rule of law and
monopolization another contradiction; the economic freedoms that the rule
of law guarantees, which are invariably transformed into a "formal, juridical
concept," facilitate the very trends towards monopolization that render the
rule of law itself irrelevant.63 Second, monopolists themselves have no use
for the rule of law; for them, the rule of law tends to protect competitors and
to limit the ability of the state to render to the monopolists individualized
support. In this vein, Neumann sees the rise of monopoly capitalism as the
force behind the rise of fascism, with its characteristic repudiation of the
rule of law, as well as the intellectual critique of the rule of law (as
epitomized by Schmitt).64
60. See Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 204-05; see also
SCHEUERMAN, supra note 35, at 50-55, 127-28.
61. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 266-85; Neumann, The Concept of
Political Freedom, supra note 6, at 205.
62. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 126.
63. Id. at 117.
64. While this dimension of the relationship between capitalism and the rule of law
remains largely outside the scope of this Article, we can venture two observations: first, that
monopoly capitalism did not destroy the rule of law in the United States (in part because of
welfare state regulations); and second, that the logic of Neumann's critique nonetheless suggests
a continued danger from this dynamic. For Neumann, the eventual result of the encounter
between the rule of law and monopoly capitalism is the descent of the rule of law into
conceptual crisis and its real-world disintegration into a regime of "reasonable" rules,
"standards of conduct," and "general principles." NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at
278-85; Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 122-33. In other
words, the rule of law is displaced by a sham that can no longer advance its normative agenda.
Id. at 129-34. And while this regime is basically consistent with the use of law to expand social
freedoms and to mitigate social inequalities, it is also more fundamentally political than the rule
of law. This ensures that the law lends itself more to the perpetuation of capitalist interests and
the erosion of social freedoms and equality. In the antithesis of the rule of law and monopoly
capitalism, Neumann discerns the foundations of a fundamental intellectual dilemma: The rule
of law can be invoked, as Neumann accuses Schmitt of doing, to frustrate (as inconsistent with
legal generality) any attempts to regulate capitalism. But at the same time, the overall
37:07591
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
Neumann's view of the welfare state, and even more so the rise of social
democracy, as more supportive of the rule of law than the alternative-the
mere abdication to the structural transformations inherent in the demise of
liberal capitalism-remains somewhat controversial. As William
Scheuerman, Neumann's sympathetic critic, points out, bureaucratization
and de-formalization inherent in social democracy and the welfare state
have indeed forced the compromise of rule of law norms.65 On the other
hand, Neumann's more optimistic view is also at least partly vindicated to
the extent that the heyday of the social welfare system, roughly from the
early 1960s through the mid 1970s, also marked the period of perhaps the
greatest and most rapid realization of rule of law norms in the United
States-this despite the social welfare system's pernicious social control
functions, which are explored in the next Part. And the relationship hardly
seems a spurious one. The reforms brought about by the social welfare
system made rule of law norms, for the first time, accessible and relatively
meaningful to millions of minorities, women, and members of the working
class.66 Nevertheless, Scheuerman's point is also well taken, which is why
this Article is concerned with significant but ultimately relative differences
in the fate of the rule of law under a mode of social control dominated by
the social welfare system versus one dominated by the criminal justice
system.
incompatibility of the rule of law with monopoly capitalism (and the welfare state) can be
drawn on-and again Neumann accuses Schmitt-to critique as obsolescent the very concept of
the rule of law. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 275-76; Neumann, The Change
in the Function of Law, supra note 5, at 127-28. Eventually, these tendencies may result in the
total and explicit repudiation of the rule of law. Again, it is Schmitt who provides Neumann
with an apt example. For in the rule of law's place Schmitt proposes a regime of based in
"decisionism," "exceptionalism," and "general principles," which allows the state to intervene
on behalf of monopolies without the law either encumbering the interests of monopolies or
dramatically expanding its fraudulence. Id. at 129-34. See generally SCHMITr, supra note 9. But
while these moves may preserve the law's logical and formal coherence, and perhaps maintain
some kind of legitimacy, they do so only by abdicating to those social forces that rendered the
rule of law problematic in the first place. The eventual result of this process, according to
Neumann, is the advent of totalitarianism, the juridical structure of which is characterized by the
complete repudiation of the rule of law. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law, supra
note 5, at 133-38.
65. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 35, at 51-52.
66. The attack on the welfare state as incompatible with the rule of law is very much a
political campaign, encompassing both functional critiques and moral critiques aimed at
exposing the incompatibility of the rule of law-and liberal democracy more generally-with
the welfare state. Claus Offe, Democracy Against the Welfare State?: Structural Foundations of
Neoconservative Political Opportunities, 15 POL. THEORY 501, 503-08 (1987) [hereinafter
Offe, Democracy Against the Welfare State].
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For its part, monopolization did not culminate in a fascist destruction of
the rule of law--or at least, this did not happen in the United States.67
Again, the period of greatest gains in the realization of rule of law norms
overlapped considerably with the era of monopoly capitalism. This may
reflect the fact that, in that period, the dominant mode of social control of
the lower classes was the social welfare system, and not the more
problematic criminal justice system, as well as the relatively limited extent
to which concentration actually resulted in outright monopolization. 68 In any
case, the effective regulation of monopolies remains an elusive goal; this
project is limited by precisely the kind of non-general rules that Neumann
anticipated.69 Needless to say as well, the corrupt, rapacious influence that
large businesses, many of them monopolistic, wield over law and politics is
an inescapable feature of contemporary life. While dated in its particulars-
and not a key concern of this Article-Neumann's explanation of the rise of
fascism and its attendant destruction of the rule of law as outgrowths of
monopoly capitalism is still an ominous reminder of the rule of law's
difficult position amidst the political realities of modem capitalism.
The value of Neumann's work for us clearly encompasses both his
critical definition of the rule of law and his unconventional view on the
relationship between the welfare state and the rule of law. But Neumann is
also quite valuable for having drawn out the contradictory nature of the
relationship between capitalism and the rule of law and in having shown
how threats to the rule of law tend to emerge, not from outside of capitalist
society or by its perversion, but rather from within its normal functions.
This provides us with quite a useful template for understanding the rule of
law's fate in relation to the changing dynamics of social control in modem
society, and later for appreciating the worrying normalcy of this condition.
67. Neumann was the first to stress the role of monopoly capital in the development of
National Socialism in Germany. See generally FRANZ L. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE
STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OFNATIONAL SOCIALISM 1933-1944 (2d ed. 1944).
68. On the argument that the monopolization played a key role in encouraging the
expansion of the welfare state-and its eventual demise, see JAMES O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL
CRISIS OF THE STATE 40-58 (1973) [hereinafter O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS].
69. An obvious example of this dynamic is the "rule of reason" in antitrust law. On the
evolution and contours of this doctrine, see, for example, PHILLIP AREEDA, THE "RULE OF
REASON" IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES (1981).
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I11. THE STATE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF MARGINALITY IN MODERN
SOCIETY
A major function of the modem, capitalist state71 is to perform functions
that are essential to the maintenance of capitalist production, but which are
not within the competency of the economy itself, or "civil society," to
provide. Several such tasks are especially significant: the provision of a
monetary system and a civil legal system for resolving inter-capitalist
disputes,7' the amelioration of the business cycle,72 the ideological
legitimation of capitalist production, 73 and the commodification of non-
natural commodities (labor foremost among them).74 Most important to us is
a role in mitigating capitalism's many social dysfunctions, including
poverty, unemployment, and marginality, and redressing their tendencies to
generate social disorder, threats of social disorder, and a repudiation of
dominant social norms among the lower classes.75
The danger that inheres in the state not intervening to manage these
tendencies is that they devolve into various kinds of crises: economic,
political, and social. The state's ultimate obligation is to prevent social
dysfunctions from developing into crises which might then pose generalized
threats to economic and social structures or to the state itself.76 As Claus
70. By the state I mean a complex of institutions that includes the government as such, the
police and security apparatus, the judiciary and legislative authorities, and the administrative
and bureaucratic structures that serve these institutions. See, e.g., RALPH MILIBAND, THE STATE
IN CAPrrALIST SOCIETY 49-55 (1969).
71. HABERMAS, supra note 45, at 53.
72. This may be described as the tendency towards periodic "disequilibrium" in the
relationship between production and consumption. Rooted in the fundamental anarchy of
capitalist production-which leaves uncoordinated the relationship between investment and
output as well as labor compensation and consumption-this type of crisis features a cycle of
overproduction and underconsumption, followed by underproduction and overconsumption.
Taking the familiar form of the "business cycle," it generates periodic episodes of
unemployment, business failures, monetary shocks, and diminished rates of return on
investment. DAVID HARVEY, THE LIMITS TO CAPITAL 190-203 (Verso 1999).
73. See, e.g., HABERMAS, supra note 45, at 36-37.
74. This theme of state supervision of the commodification of things essential to capitalist
production is perhaps best displayed in the work of economic historian Karl Polanyi. See
generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). On this and the state's role in
constructing the ideology of capitalism, see also MICHAEL PERELMAN, THE INVENTION OF
CAPITALISM: CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF PRIMITIVE
ACCUMULATION (2000).
75. See, e.g., HABERMAS, supra note 45, at 21, 35-37; HARVEY, supra note 72, at 82-85,
179-95; BOB JESSOP, THE FUTURE OF THE CAPITALIST STATE 18-22, 42-44 (2002).
76. Capitalism is defined by the generalization of several economic structures; these
include the production of commodities by wage labor, private ownership of the means of
production, and the logic of production and consumption centered on the accumulation of
wealth as capital. Like every social system, one based in the dominance of capitalism is fraught
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Offe describes it, the modern, capitalist state is permanently and
fundamentally devoted in this guise to a mission of "crisis management.,
77
The performance of crisis management by the state cannot be a neutral
or genuinely pluralistic enterprise. Rather, it is an inherently political
undertaking steeped in class and other social conflicts. This follows from
the fact that the social order that is defended in this process is not itself
normatively neutral or pluralistically governed, but instead is premised on
an unequal allocation of property, political power, control of the production
process, and on systematic exploitation; and it is governed accordingly.
78
Further, the modern state functions within an overarching ideological
structure that itself imprisons politics (and jurisprudence) to the hegemony
of capitalism and an agenda focused on "different conceptions of how to
run the same economic and social system, and not about radically different
social systems. 79
The class agenda that inheres in the state's crisis management functions
is nowhere more evident than where the state undertakes to mitigate the
effects of poverty, unemployment, and other forms of social marginality.
Even where the state's actions strike a benign tone, as with social welfare,
with tendencies towards crisis. What sets capitalism apart as a social system in this regard is the
nature of its crises, which are primarily economic and only secondarily political or legal. In
other words, a unique feature of capitalist society is the persistent development of economic
crises, which are then articulated politically and displaced onto the state and, eventually, the
legal system. This theme is particularly well developed by Jurgen Habermas in his
LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supra note 45. The appreciation of capitalism as a system mired in crisis
tendencies owes much to Marx, for whom this matter was an obvious preoccupation. For Marx,
the root of crisis in capitalism is class conflict, which generated competing interests, ideologies,
and social roles, which in turn reflect themselves in an institutional structure that is anarchical
and unstable. More narrowly, the source of crisis in capitalism inheres in the effort to sustain the
process of capital accumulation-which basically entails the successful investment of capital-
in a manner that is both economically viable and politically legitimate. HARVEY, supra note 72,
at 82-85.
77. Indeed, for Offe, the characteristic function of the modem, capitalist state is actually a
permanent state of "crisis of crisis management." CLAUS OFFE, "Crisis of Crisis Management":
Elements of a Political Crisis Theory, in CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 35-36 (John
Keane ed., 1984) [hereinafter OFFE, Crisis of Crisis Management].
78. MILIBAND, supra note 70, at 77-80, 147-55. This is not to suggest that capitalism
destroys every distinction among formal political groups; or that under its reign the state is
reduced, as Marx rather intemperately suggested, to an "executive committee" of the
bourgeoisie. KARL MARX, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 57 (Frederic L. Bender ed., Norton
1988) (1848). Rather, the state is dominated, not strictly owned, by economic elites who wield
hegemonic control over its machinery. MILIBAND, supra note 70, at 23-48, 55. Ralph Miliband
describes a number of factors that facilitate elite control of the state: the proliferation of
business representatives and their middle-class allies in government, the "colonization" of the
administrative state, and the ideological definition of "national interests" in terms of business
interests. Id. at 57-67.
79. Id. at 68-76.
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they inevitably involve a strong element of repressive socialization, or
social control. 80 This is because social marginality and attendant threats to
social order and the reign of functional social norms are natural outcomes of
the class structure of capitalism. In seeking to mitigate these dysfunctions
and their effects, the state essentially supports the dynamics of class
exploitation that create them in the first place-and makes clear its
expectation that the lower classes resign themselves to this reality. In other
words, the order that is secured by social control is an order that supports
exploitation, injustice, and inequality.
While the social welfare system and the criminal justice system are not
the exclusive modes of social control of the lower classes, they are the most
important-especially among those modes that are sponsored by the state-
and most directly implicate rule of law concerns about the limits of
sovereignty. 81 As this Part reveals, this project of exerting social control
over the lower classes can be in varying degrees "hard" or "soft"; it can be
more or less repressive, and more or less governed by rule of law norms.
The representative model of soft intervention is the social welfare system,
and the representative model of hard intervention is the criminal justice
system. As the following discussion demonstrates, the last several decades
have seen a solid shift in American society from the social welfare system
to the criminal justice system as the dominant mode of social control of the
lower classes.82 This Part reviews the main features of each of these modes
of social control.
80. Social control is, in this sense, a "mechanism to insure compliance with [social]
norms" in a context of conflict. Robert F. Meier, Perspectives on the Concept of Social Control,
8 ANN. REV. Soc. 35, 35, 37-38 (1982). See generally Allen E. Liska, Social Structure and
Social Control: Building Theory, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 345 (1993). On the evolution of the
concept of social control, see generally Morris Janowitz, Sociological Theory and Social
Control, 81 AM. J. Soc. 82 (1975). The concept of social control is susceptible to
misconstruction and abuse. Much of this involves appeals to its rhetorical power to add weight
to otherwise unwarranted claims. This can only be avoided by a serious concern for empirical
and analytical rigor. Another misuse of the concept of social control involves confusion of
functionality with essentiality. Just because the social welfare system or criminal justice system
can be shown to contribute to the maintenance of class hierarchy, for example, does not make
them either indispensable or invariably committed to that agenda.
81. Schools, government controlled health care, and the military, for example, represent
other state sponsored institutions of social control. On the parameters of the social control
phenomenon, see, for example, Peter Conrad, Medicalization and Social Control, 18 ANN. REV.
Soc. 209 (1992). See generally Eugene Litwak, Three Ways in Which Law Acts as a Means of
Social Control: Punishment, Therapy, and Education: Divorce Law a Case in Point, 34 SoC.
FORCES 217 (1956). For a critical review of literature on various dynamics of social control, see
Allen E. Liska, Modeling the Relationships Between Macro Forms of Social Control, 23 ANN.
REV. Soc. 39, 39-53 (1997).
82. The state faces enormous difficulties in carrying out its crisis-mitigating functions,
particularly in regards to social control. An acknowledgment of these difficulties and of the way
780 [Ariz. St. L.J.
RULE OF LAW'S UNCERTAIN FATE
A. Social Control and the Social Welfare System
The idea of the social welfare state as an institution of social control has
perhaps its most important intellectual roots in the work of the economic
historian Karl Polanyi, who in the 1930s argued that the stability and
legitimacy of the capitalist system depend on an ability to tame self interests
and to alleviate the inherent tendencies of its market functions to generate
immoral and politically and socially unstable outcomes.83 To be sure, the
modem social welfare system was shaped by a number of factors, including
Keynesian economic policy as well as humane and enlightened efforts on
the part of political elites to alleviate the suffering of the lower classes.84
But Polanyi's rather more critical view of its origins is compelling. And
more contemporary scholars than he, including Frances Fox Piven and
Richard Cloward, have elaborated his thesis to argue that the social welfare
system arose to advance an agenda of social control directed at mitigating
the social dysfunctions that tend to follow from social marginality-
protests, riots, and general criminality, as well as the breakdown of labor
market participation and labor discipline. Articulated politically as palpable
threats to social order, dysfunctions of class society are redressed by the
social welfare system in several ways: by the direct alleviation of conditions
of privation and alienation that engender such disorder; by the mobilization
of the lower classes to participate in the capitalist labor market, even under
undesirable working conditions; and by the affirmation of an ideology of
labor discipline and general compliance with capitalist norms among the
lower classes.85
they coexist alongside the state's successes in crisis-mitigation represents an important
development in contemporary discourse on the nature of the state. While the modem state has
maintained the overall integrity of capitalism notwithstanding its crisis tendencies, this has been
achieved at significant cost. In other words, the state, like the rule of law, can be seen as having
a contradictory, and not merely complementary, relationship to capitalism. See, e.g., Boris
Frankel, On the State of the State: Marxist Theories of the State After Leninism, 7 THEORY &
Soc'Y 199 (1979).
83. See generally POLANYI, supra note 74.
84. On the many different ways of understating the origins and functions of the welfare
state, see, for example, Jill Quadagno, Theories of the Welfare State, 13 ANN. REv. Soc. 109
(1987). It is important to stress the inadequacy of simple humanitarian concerns in explaining
the origins and functions of the social welfare system. Such "Whig" notions can offer only a
partial explanation of the nature of welfare. For perhaps the class example of such a view of the
social welfare system, see T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in SOCIOLOGY AT THE
CROSSROADS 67 (T.H. Marshall ed., Heinemann 1963).
85. See FRANCES Fox PiVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 8-32 (1971) [hereinafter PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING THE
POOR].
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The direct mitigation of unemployment and poverty is the social welfare
system's most straightforward (and, on the surface at least, benign) social
control function. Since its inception, the social welfare system has offered
to the poor and the unemployed a number of benefits in times of structural
economic crisis or demonstrated personal need-cash public assistance,
food aid, subsidized housing and health insurance, unemployment
insurance, and the like. This is partly a humanitarian function, consistent
with the role of the lower classes themselves in demanding some
protections from the harsh realities of life in capitalist society. And such
benefits have been important to raising the standard of living of the lower
classes. But in the same fashion, welfare benefits also work to prevent
social marginality from generating widespread disorder and noncompliance
with social norms, including riots and criminal attacks on institutions of
property and authority, or from leading to a normalization of "deviant"
modes of life. Welfare benefits serve as both a means of bribing the poor
into maintaining their faith in the existing social and political order, and as a
way of reducing the level of material deprivation out of which disorder and
noncompliance with mainstream social norms grow. Consistent with this
view, the expansion of the welfare state corresponds not simply to objective
increases in social distress among the lower classes, but instead to episodes
of protest, riot, and unrest that often accompany such conditions.86
86. This is a major theme of Piven and Cloward's signature work, Regulating the Poor. Id.
at 17-22, 61-76, 100-11, 228-45; cf CLAUS OFFE, Some Contradictions of the Modern Welfare
State, in CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 147, 157-61 (John Keane ed., 1984)
[hereinafter OFFE, Contradictions of the Welfare State]. According to this view, the social
welfare system was directly shaped by the political agitation of the lower classes demanding the
support of the state and by the broad threat to social order inherent not only in such agitation,
but also in the unchecked pervasion of mass poverty, unemployment and underemployment, and
other dysfunctions that are in many ways all normal parts of the lower class experience under
capitalism. While not uncontroversial, Piven and Cloward's thesis can draw on considerable
anecdotal support. President Johnson, for example, viewed the war on poverty as, in large part,
an anti-crime program. KATHERINE BECKETr, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 36-37 (1997). And President Nixon's apparent
willingness to expand the welfare state to include a guaranteed income component was based in
his view that this was necessary to stave off social disorder. See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE
POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY
ASSISTANCE PLAN 110 (Random House 1973). The thesis is bolstered by subsequent empirical
research as well. See generally Larry Isaac & William R. Kelly, Racial Insurgency, the State,
and Welfare Expansion: Local and National Level Evidence from the Postwar United States, 86
AM. J. Soc. 1348 (1981); Stanford F. Schram & J. Patrick Turbett, Civil Disorder and the
Welfare Explosion: A Two-Step Process, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 408 (1983). But see generally
Eugene Durman, Have the Poor Been Regulated? Toward a Multivariate Understanding of
Welfare Growth, 47 SoC. SERV. REV. 339 (1973). Strong support can also be found for the thesis
that the welfare state evolved in response to agitation from the left. See generally David Brady,
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Augmenting this dimension of social control, the provision of welfare
benefits also performs what might be called a displacing function: inserting
the state (and its legal and administrative apparatus) as an intermediary in
what would otherwise be a direct-and from the standpoint of the
legitimacy of capital, a more costly-conflict between the lower classes and
the economic elite. To put this another way, the social welfare system
refocuses class discontent away from capital and its beneficiaries, to the
state. By developing a social welfare system, the state not only socializes,
but also politicizes and legalizes structural deficiencies of the capitalist
system and the dynamics of class conflict that accompany these
deficiencies. 87
Other dimensions of the social welfare system's social control function
are both less overt and more coercive. This is evident in its encouragement
of labor market participation. Through the modem history of the welfare
state, this has been advanced by several interlocking strategies: by limiting
the amount of support offered to eligible recipients to a level below the
average prevailing wage, thus preserving an incentive to work; by limiting
eligibility for welfare programs based on some combination of substantial
need and a demonstrated inability to work;8 8 and by actual work
requirements as a condition of welfare eligibility (the wages of which are
then subsidized by the welfare system).8 9 Each of these strategies reflects a
different way of advancing the "principle of 'less eligibility'"-the concept
of maintaining levels of social support that by their designed inadequacy
The Politics of Poverty: Left Political Institutions, the Welfare State, and Poverty, 82 Soc.
FORCES 557 (2003).
87. See O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS, supra note 68, at 6-9. In this same light, such
benefits may be seen as part of what Offe calls a "peace formula" that purchases a "truce" in the
domain of class conflict. OFFE, Contradictions of the Welfare State, supra note 86, at 147. Such
benefits serve both to ameliorate social conditions that tend to cause social unrest and to reward
those individuals who eschew insurrection or criminality as responses to their experience of
social problems. Id.
88. For a description of this agenda as it worked in the late 1960s and early 1970s, see
JOEL F. HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR: WELFARE POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND MORALITY 25-
46 (1972). In fact, "work relief' has been a persistent feature of modem social welfare. PIVEN &
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 85, at 33-36, 81-117. For the most part, the
American welfare state has advanced this logic by the very practice of limiting traditional
welfare benefits to the "deserving" poor: women, children, and the disabled.
89. Although associated with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1305 et. seq.), which expanded it dramatically, "workfare" has been a feature of the
modem welfare system since the 1960s. Eileen Boris, When Work is Slavery, 25 SOC. JUST.,
Spring 1998, at 28, 29-32. See generally Frances Fox Piven, Welfare and Work, 25 SOC. JUST.,
Spring 1998, at 67.
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encourage people to remain in the private labor market.9" By this logic, the
lower classes may be guaranteed some level of insurance against utter
destitution, but only if they submit to the labor market and accept levels of
support that are no more beneficial than available market wages.
Another dimension of the welfare system's social control function
involves its articulation of an ideology of labor discipline and of overall
compliance with the norms and structures of capitalist society. This
program, which is the adjunct to more direct means of encouraging labor
market participation, is accomplished by draconian means including work
requirements for receiving public assistance, job search requirements for
unemployment, the use of surveillance and interrogation regimes to ensure
compliance, and a pervasive tendency to humiliate and dehumanize
beneficiaries. These features of the social welfare system advance the idea
that labor market participation is normal and is expected by the state, even
where such work is deeply alienating and exploitative, and the added idea
that the receipt of state support in lieu of work is not only exceptional and
practically difficult to obtain but also socially deviant.9' As Piven and
Cloward write, "[t]o demean and punish those who do not work is to exalt
by contrast even the meanest labor at the meanest wages. 92 The
disciplinary effect of these aspects of social welfare is genuinely
ideological, they argue, in that it extends beyond the recipient herself, who
often cannot work anyway, to serve as a lesson to the able-bodied as well. 93
Although especially evident in recent welfare reforms, the articulation of
this ideological program of labor discipline has always been a feature of the
modem social welfare system, functioning alongside the social welfare
system's somewhat better recognized program of "moral" training.94 And
90. PIvEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 85, at 35, 130-31; Piven,
supra note 89, at 68.
91. Such measures, couched in terms of distinguishing the deserving from the
underdeserving, characterize the entire history of welfare. MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW
OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA passim (10th anniversary ed.
1996). They were very much in place at the inception of the modem system in the 1930s. Id. at
231-42. For documentation of their use, see generally JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR:
SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001).
92. PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 85, at 3-4.
93. In their words, "[t]he main target of these [humiliating administrative] rituals is not the
recipient who ordinarily is not of much use as a worker, but the able-bodied poor who remain in
the labor market. It is for these people that the spectacle of the degraded pauper is intended." Id.
at 173.
94. Predictably, such moral training is particularly directed at controlling-and
condemning-the lives and values of poor women. See generally MIMI ABRAMOVITZ,
REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT (1988). This agenda, which is uniquely relevant to the welfare state's special tendency
to control the lives of women, is imposed by various eligibility requirements, which may
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the prosecution of this ideology of labor discipline has not been limited to
traditional forms of welfare, like public assistance, food aid, and
unemployment insurance, but also describes more ancillary aspects of the
social welfare system, for example child welfare services.
95
Among Piven and Cloward's more interesting observations is that these
various social control functions respond to different kinds of social
dysfunction. The provision of benefits to mute tendencies toward social
unrest is more relevant under conditions of labor surplus-for example,
mass unemployment in times of recession; while labor discipline by the
restriction of eligibility and other devices may be more relevant in times of
relative labor shortage and prosperity. For Piven and Cloward, this logic has
imported to social welfare policy a broadly cyclical character, modulated by
the business cycle and its interaction with the dynamics of social protest.96
In this they see the social welfare system's social control function as truly
regulatory in its response to the contradictory nature of the state's role in
capitalist society-its need both to mitigate capitalism's dysfunctions and,
simultaneously, to preserve the essential integrity of the very institutions
that generate these dysfunctions.
As this overview demonstrates, the social welfare system is neither
fundamentally benign nor devoid of coercive elements. Indeed, within the
institutional structures and the history of the social welfare system is an
internal spectrum of both soft and hard, both more and less coercive,
approaches to the problem of social control of the lower classes. And that
problem itself is as rooted in maintaining the stability of the social order and
its normative structures as it is in redressing the plight of the lower classes
for their own sakes. At the same time, however, the prosecution of social
control via the social welfare system is relatively benign in comparison to
the criminal justice system. For this reason, it is also much less problematic
in its relationship to the rule of law than this successor means of social
control.
include, ineligibility where would-be recipients give birth to "illegitimate" children, engage in
extramarital sexual behavior, or otherwise maintain an "unsuitable home"-and accompanying
systems surveillance, interrogation, and other forms of verification. See HANDLER, supra note
88, at 33-37; PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 85, at 138-41, 166, 173-
75. On the way this agenda is expressed under recent reform statutes, see generally Susan L.
Thomas, Race, Gender, and Welfare Reform: The Antinatalist Response, 28 J. BLACK STUD. 419
(1998).
95. Several important works describe labor discipline as a function of child welfare
services. See generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY
BESIEGED (1977); ANTHONY PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d
ed. 1977).
96. For their outline of this thesis, see PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR, supra
note 85, at 3-41.
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B. Social Control and the Criminal Justice System
The modem criminal justice system accommodates an agenda of social
control strikingly similar in its key functions to that of the social welfare
system-and strikingly different in the strength of its commitment to
punitive means of articulating these functions. Conventional accounts of the
criminal justice system tend to obscure its social control agenda behind the
idea that its origins and functions lie with the prevention and punishment of
crime or even the humanitarian reform of offenders. Such purported bases
of criminal justice, which are ideologized ad nauseam in "justification
theories," are not always inaccurate characterizations of what the system
actually does and how it arose. But like humanitarian interpretations of the
social welfare system, they conceal a more dominant project of social
control that is only obliquely concerned with protecting people, or with
punishing or reforming the guilty, and is at least as concerned with
constructing and maintaining social order in the face of threats of conflict
and crisis. 97 Behind the fagade of justifications, the criminal justice system
is an institution of social control oriented to the management of
dysfunctions inherent in capitalist society-unemployment, poverty, and the
like-that, if left unchecked, tend to produce untenable levels of social
disorder and deviance.
98
97. While this effort to see the criminal law as an implement of social control draws its
inspiration from the most identifiable critics of modem state and society, in particular Marx and
Foucault, it is important to see the concept's more distant roots in Western thought. In their
concern either to justify or to restrain the emergent modem state, for example, figures from
Hobbes and Locke to Rousseau and Hegel were all implicitly inclined to see the state as
enjoying broad influences over society. It was as a way of laying out the limits of social
control-consistent, of course, with certain political agendas-that critics like these developed
the doctrines of "rule of law" and "social contract." What is the law itself, and what are rights in
particular, if not means of describing the parameters of the state's social control prerogative?
See generally DARIO MELOSSI, THE STATE OF SOCIAL CONTROL: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF
CONCEPTS OF STATE AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE MAKING OF DEMOCRACY (1990). See also
ALLAN V. HORwrrz, THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL CONTROL 1-5 (1990).
98. From this perspective, the criminal justice system is in large part an institution of class
repression. For an overview of this perspective, see, for example, RICHARD QUINNEY, CRITIQUE
OF LEGAL ORDER: CRIME CONTROL IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY 51-55 (1974). In line with the
similar perspective on welfare, the view of the criminal justice system as an institution of social
control rests on a "conflict model" of criminal law, one that sees the criminal law as a reflection,
not of consensual values, but of conflicts between social groups. For a review of the conflict
model, see, for example, Allen E. Liska, A Critical Examination of Macro Perspectives on
Crime Control, 13 ANN. REV. SOC. 67, 77-84 (1987). Moreover, for those who conceptualize
institutions in terms of the modem concept of social control, neither the doctrines of the
criminal law, nor its justifications are sufficient, or even very important to understanding its real
nature. Instead, social control approaches to the criminal law are typically critical, empirical,
and historical. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY 3-22 (1990) [hereinafter GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY]; see also
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Even from a distance, this view of the criminal justice system is
consistent in the broadest sense with its overwhelmingly disproportionate
impact on the lower classes. The likelihood of being arrested or tried for,
convicted of, or punished for a crime is almost entirely reserved to the
lower classes-in particular younger males who straddle the boundary
between the working class and the chronically unemployed,
underemployed, or illegally employed. 99 Embedded within this dynamic is
an equally impressive overrepresentation of racial minorities, and especially
blacks, in the criminal justice system. While race is surely to some degree
an independent axis of social control, the salience of race in the criminal
justice system seems primarily to reflect a demographic entanglement with
class as well as the broader sweep of the criminal justice system's hand over
the socially marginalized. 00 To put this another way, in the contemporary
criminal justice system race and class are substantially interconnected
dimensions of social marginality; both signal the kinds of threats to social
order and normative stability that tend to activate coercive forms of social
control.
The consistent overrepresentation of the lower classes in the criminal
justice system leads to the obvious conclusion that such people simply
commit more crimes than middle and upper class people. As far as it goes,
WILLIAM CHAMBLISS & ROBERT SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER, AND POWER 172-202 (2d ed. 1982).
See generally Donald Black, Crime as Social Control, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 34 (1983).
99. For example, a 1991 nationwide survey of state prison inmates found that the vast
majority earned less than $15,000 in the year before their confinement, with more than half
earning less than $10,000. ALLEN BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 136949, SURVEY OF
STATE PRISON INMATES, 1991, at 3 (1993). Along similar lines, a 1996 nationwide survey of jail
inmates found that thirty-six percent were unemployed before incarceration and that almost half
of inmates reported making less than $600 a month before being jailed. CAROLINE WOLF
HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 164620, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES, 1996, at 3-4 (1998).
Studies of criminal defendants in New York City in the early 1990s revealed that a majority
were unemployed; among the employed, most earned only a few hundred dollars a week; only a
very few possessed any real assets or even banking accounts. Andrew Karmen, Property,
Crime, and Criminal Justice, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 25, 27 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000).
Another report from that same year found that over eighty percent of all felony defendants in
the largest county jurisdictions nationwide required state-funded, indigent representation.
CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 179023, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL CASES 1, 5 (2000). Likewise, most prison inmates have never completed high school.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 177613, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1997, at 48, tbl.4.1 (2000).
100. On the complex intersection of class and race in the criminal justice system, see
generally MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
(1995). For a review of the theoretical linkages of class, race, and gender, see generally Carroll
Seron & Frank Munger, Law and Inequality: Race, Gender.., and, of Course, Class, 22 ANN.
REV. SOC. 187 (1996).
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this is clearly true. For many scholars this fact has inspired a sympathetic (if
also sometimes patronizing) search for "criminogenic" forces in lower class
life. This is a major concern of both liberal and radical criminology, which
often see the roots of lower class criminality in its members' greater
alienation from conventional, middle and upper class rules of social order,
in their frequent dependency on crime for material support, and in the fact
that they incur much higher costs complying with these rules in any case.l10
There are other ways of confronting the relationship between crime and
class. One is to recognize that the formal definition of crimes and their
punishments do not reflect any natural, innate ordering of wrongfulness or
socially harmful behavior. Instead, notions of what is wrong, what is
socially harmful, and what is proper punishment reflect political choices
that disfavor lower class people-who of course have less access to the
political power and influence over the legal system necessary to define the
boundaries of criminality in the first place. The way this process
simultaneously criminalizes whole populations of lower class, urban males,
usually racial minorities, while discounting the socially destructive behavior
of more powerful groups is aptly described in the literature.'l 2
The bias inherent in substantive definitions of crimes and punishments in
modern society accords with a deeper logic. The substance of the criminal
law reflects that of the dominant social institutions in society. This dynamic
is nowhere more clearly evident than in changing notions of property and
theft, a subject of classic discourses on the social history of crime and
punishment. The young Marx, for example, famously explored this theme
relative to the transformation of common property and common right into
101. This perspective takes several related forms. Some scholars emphasize how
capitalism's tendency to generate "egoism," results in higher levels of criminality among the
lower classes. See generally WILLIAM A. BONGER, CRIMINALITY AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
(Henry P. Horton trans., 1916). For others, the "social strain" of capitalism-its tendency to
create disjuncture of means and ends-is at fault. See generally RICHARD A. CLOWARD &
LLOYD E. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY: A THEORY OF DELINQUENCY GANGS
(1960); ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (enlarged ed. 1968). For
still others, the causal relationship between capitalism and lower class criminality inheres in
"ecological" conditions of social disorder. See generally CLIFFORD SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS (1942). For a description of more contemporary
approaches, see generally Theodore G. Chiricos, Rates of Crime and Unemployment: An
Analysis ofAggregate Research Evidence, 34 Soc. PROBS. 187 (1987) (reviewing the research in
this area). See also Robert Agnew, Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and
Delinquency, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 47 (1992).
102. See generally STEVEN Box, POWER, CRIME, AND MYSTIFICATION (1983); Andrew
Hopkins, Class Bias in the Criminal Law, 5 CONTEMP. CRISES 385 (1981); AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1971).
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private property and theft in the rise of capitalism. 0 3 A similar concern
motivated E. P. Thompson in his analysis of eighteenth century game laws
as a mechanism for protecting emerging forms of property and abetting the
reconstruction of class relations along more modern, capitalist lines.1 °4
This view of the substance of the criminal law as both reflecting and
advancing the institutional and ideological interests of economic elites, and
so extending the criminal law's bias against the lower classes, remains very
much relevant today. In one respect, this thesis is borne out by the criminal
law's continued commitment to protecting private property and other key
institutions of market exchange from violence, theft, and other kinds of
disorder, as well as from seditious political activity. 105 And it is also evident
in more dynamic form in the increasing use of the criminal justice system in
recent years to create and protect value in intellectual property, 106 as well as
in the criminal law's constantly evolving proscription of "immoral" areas of
employment.107 Similarly, the criminal law's substantive bias is also
reflected in those behaviors that it leaves beyond either its nominal
condemnation or its effective sanction: consumer frauds; enslavement,
sweatshops, and other violations of labor and employment law; and all
manner of crimes committed against the poor.
Such critical views of the criminal justice system do much to undermine
the notion that higher rates of criminality among the lower classes (or for
that matter, racial minorities) merely reflect a greater tendency to behave in
immoral or socially harmful ways. But these perspectives leave unanswered
a number of key questions. What protective functions are served by the
criminal law's valorization of property, the conceptually arbitrary (but
politically relevant) distinction between criminal and non-criminal
behaviors, or the way that the criminal law is enforced? Why is the
103. See generally Peter Linebaugh, Karl Marx, the Theft of Wood, and Working Class
Composition: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 6 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 5 (1976).
104. THOMPSON, supra note 23, at 226; see also Douglas Hay, Poaching and the Game
Laws on Cannock Chase, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 189, 244-53 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975).
105. See, e.g., Jeffrey Reiman, The Marxian Critique of Criminal Justice, in RADICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 111, 129-33 (David S. Caudill & Steven Jay Gold eds., 1995). See
generally MARK NEOCLEOUS, THE FABRICATION OF SOCIAL ORDER: A CRITICAL THEORY OF
POLICE POWER (2000).
106. See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An
Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731 (2003).
107. Among these activities are criminalized forms of gambling, begging, the illegal drug
trade, and prostitution, each of which has its cognate in substantially similar, but non-criminal
activity. On the class control functions inherent in the regulation of such activities by the
criminal justice system, see SIDNEY L. HARRING, POLICING A CLASS SOCIETY: THE EXPERIENCE
OF AMERICAN CITIES, 1865-1915, at 149-200 (1983) [hereinafter HARING, POLICING A CLASS
SOCIETY].
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contemporary criminal justice system so inclined to sanction the lower
classes, especially in an era of international "labor arbitrage" where the
aggregate social value of labor is directly related to its overabundance and
where the fiscal burdens of criminal sanctions are so high? And what value
is served, if not the furtherance of some transcendentally valid moral and
utilitarian agenda, by the achievement of widespread obedience to the law
on the part of the lower classes? These questions frame a very different
inquiry into the nature of the criminal justice system as an institution not of
social protection or of sanction and symbolism in the abstract, but of social
control aimed at the lower classes.
The attempt to uncover in the criminal justice system an agenda of social
control has tended to ascribe to the system three main functions: asserting
direct forms of control over surplus labor, especially via the criminal justice
system's relationship to unemployment; mobilizing idle labor to participate
in the capitalist labor market; and generally disciplining the lower classes to
acquiesce to the prevailing norms of property, hierarchy, and authority. A
brief review of these aspects of the criminal justice system highlights their
logic, history, and bases in social thought.
1. Punishment and Surplus Labor
The notion that the criminal justice system serves to control surplus labor
consists of the view that criminal punishment works to regulate the ranks of
surplus labor-the pools of unemployed, underemployed, and
unemployable people-that are generated in the normal functioning of the
capitalist economy. This thesis rests on a particular view of the relationship
between the criminal justice system and the dynamics of political economy.
Key to the development of such a perspective is the work of Georg Rusche
and Otto Kirchheimer.
In the 1930s, Rusche and Kirchheimer presented a revolutionary account
of the relationship between criminal punishment and political economy.
That work was prefaced with the view that "the bond" supposed, "to exist
between crime and punishment prevents any insight into the independent
significance of the history of penal systems. It must be broken."' 10 8
"Punishment," they contended, "must be understood as a social
phenomenon freed from both its juristic concept and its social ends."'0 9
108. GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 5
(Russell & Russell 1968) (1939).
109. Id.
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With passages like this one, Rusche and Kirchheimer set forth the first of
a number of insights that have proven central not only to an understanding
of the labor control functions of criminal punishment, but also to an
appreciation of the social control dimensions of the criminal justice system
more broadly. In particular, as the passages above reveal, they contend that
there exists in modem societies no general connection either between
justifications for (or theories of) punishment and what the criminal law
actually does, or between punishment policies and the empirical realities of
crime and criminality. Instead the whole enterprise of criminal justice must
be understood above all in its relationship to the economic structures of
society. "0
From this perspective, Rusche and Kirchheimer determined that both the
mode and the level or intensity of criminal punishment in society are largely
determined in the first instance by social, or class, structure, and in the
second instance by the prevailing social value of labor."' They concluded in
this vein that imprisonment has its origins in the rise of capitalism, the
commodity form, and the factory system. These developments conspired to
reduce the social value of individuals to that of their labor, to reduce their
lives to the measures of time on which the logic of incarceration is
traditionally based, and to instill the utilitarian framework that underlies the
key justification of incarceration. Likewise via the factory and related
systems of production and management, these developments provided the
organizational and architectural templates on which the modem prison
would be based. Finally-and this leads to one of their most important
insights as far as we are concerned-these developments created for the
prison its primary functions: the control and disciplining of a population no
longer subject to the security and certainty of pre-capitalist life.
110. Showing clearly the influence of Marx, Rusche and Kirchheimer suggest that this
correspondence between economic structures and criminal punishment reflects a still more
integral relationship between criminality and class conflict. The criminal law and its institutions
of punishment are neither simply indexes of, nor functional responses to, the levels of moral
wrongfulness or social harm in the abstract. Rather, the entire criminal justice system is
conditioned by class conflict and ultimately facilitates the control and domination of the
interests of powerful classes over weaker classes, capital over labor. In this light, traditional
justifications for crime and punishment are, presumptively, ideological forms which a truly
critical account of punishment must be prepared to transcend. Id. at 72-83, 95-102, 141-43; cf
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 3-37, xi-xiv (1991).
111. In this sense, they actually advance a two-part thesis about the relationship between
punishment and social structure: a "severity of punishment" argument, which holds that
punishment tends to become more severe in times of economic decline; and a "utility of
punishment" argument, which holds that punishment expands in scale in times of economic
decline to absorb surplus labor. It is primarily the latter of these that concerns us. On the
interrelationship of these arguments, see, for example, IvAN JANKOVIC, PUNtSHMENT AND THE
POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1977).
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Rusche and Kirchheimer determined that, while social and economic
structures broadly influence the kind of punishments prevalent in a society,
the social value of labor tends to determine the relative severity of sanctions
within that system of punishment. And so, while the rise of capitalism
prefigured the rise of the prison, it also tied the length and prevalence of
prison sentences to the value of labor, hence to the prevailing level of
surplus labor. When labor is abundant, imprisonment increases as
imprisonment serves to warehouse surplus labor and to drive workers to
work at prevailing wages. When labor is relatively scarce, imprisonment
falls as the need to control workers diminishes and more workers are
returned to the market.
112
This is, in a nutshell, Rusche and Kirchheimer's thesis on the nature of
criminal punishment as a mechanism of labor control. Although more rigid
and economistic than many modem scholars would prefer, their approach is
not insensitive to countervailing tendencies. Rusche and Kirchheimer
recognized that in times of extreme labor scarcity or social crisis,
incarceration itself might play a direct role in putting people to work-with
the prison essentially becoming a workshop, factory, or labor agency. 3
They were also aware that political forces can alter imprisonment practices
in ways contrary to the logic of labor control, sometimes increasing
incarceration, sometimes decreasing it.114 Likewise, they appreciated that
fiscal concerns may often impose completely extraneous limitations on how
many people the state can afford to incarcerate, perhaps contrary to the
logic of labor control. And yet they thought the basic correlation between
unemployment and incarceration would generally hold true in the long
run. 
1 5
This extraordinary idea about the relationship between criminal
punishment and surplus labor-in fact, between the whole of the criminal
justice system and surplus labor-represents one of the most influential
efforts to uncover the social control functions of the criminal justice system.
112. Georg Rusche, Labor Market and Penal Sanction: Thoughts on the Sociology of
Criminal Justice, 10 CRIME & SOC. JUST., 2, 4-5 (Gerda Dinwiddie, trans.) (1978).
113. The use of the criminal law to mobilize labor in this direct fashion is particularly
evident with regard to blacks in the American South. See generally DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE
WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED LABOR AFTER SLAVERY (1978). In other cases, criminal
law, especially vagrancy law, was used to mobilize white workers. See generally Sidney L.
Harring, Class Conflict and the Suppression of Tramps in Buffalo, 1892-1894, 11 J. LAW &
SoC'Y 873 (1977); Amy Dru Stanley, Beggars Can't Be Choosers: Compulsion and Contract in
Postbellum America, 78 J. AM. HIST. 1265 (1992); Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind of Labor
Law: Vagrancy Law and the Regulation of Harvest Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 667
(2004).
114. Rusche, supra note 112, at 4.
115. RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 108, passim.
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The labor control thesis has inspired a number of contemporary efforts to
demonstrate a connection between imprisonment and labor supply. Over
forty statistical studies as well as several narrative accounts have been
compiled that confirm a direct relationship between unemployment and
incarceration or other forms of criminal punishment.'16 While uncertainty
persists, this research tends to support Rusche and Kirchheimer's thesis,
demonstrating positive relationships between punishment and labor supply
in regard to prison admissions, overall prison population size, and severity
of sentence. 1 7 As we shall see shortly, though, the most important feature of
Rusche and Kirchheimer's work is not so much this notion of a direct
relationship between criminal justice and labor supply, but a broader, more
contextual sense of the relationship between criminal justice and labor.
An important question follows from the labor control thesis: By what
modes of mediation does unemployment influence incarceration rates? For
Rusche and Kirchheimer, the mediation between incarceration and
unemployment inheres in the convergence of two factors: the effect of
unemployment on the social value of labor and the principle of lesser
eligibility, which we have already discussed in relationship to the social
welfare system. They reasoned that as an increase in labor supply lowers the
social value of labor, this, in turn, diminishes political and moral
impediments to punishment. Greater unemployment also worsens social
conditions for the poor, which, according to the principle of lesser
eligibility, makes it more difficult to maintain incarceration's disciplinary or
deterrent effect without increasing both its scope and intensity.
Accordingly, maintaining the same level of social control under conditions
of increased unemployment requires an increase in the punitive character of
punishment. 8
116. For a review of these efforts, see generally Theodore G. Chiricos & Miriam A.
Delone, Labor Surplus and Punishment: A Review and Assessment of Theory and Evidence, 39
SOC. PROBS. 421 (1992).
117. Chiricos and Delone found considerable support for the labor control thesis. Among
their determinations is that "the relationship of labor surplus to punishment is more than six
times as likely to be positive (87 percent) as negative (13 percent) and nineteen times as likely
to be significant and positive (57 percent) as significant and negative (3 percent)." Id. at 428.
This held true for prisons admission, overall prison population, and severity of sentence; it also
held true for different levels of "aggregation" (e.g., national, state, and county). Id. at 428-29.
This body of research also indicates a relationship between unemployment and criminal
punishment that is "independent of the mediating influence of criminal behavior." Id. at 429.
118. See, e.g., RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 108, at 151-52; see also Dario Melossi,
Gazette of Morality and Social Whip: Punishment, Hegemony and the Case of the USA, 1970-
92, 2 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 259, 262 (1993) [hereinafter Melossi, Gazette of Morality and Social
Whip].
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Others have sought to complement this view of the specific connection
between incarceration and unemployment with the notion that
unemployment puts more pressure on the state to maintain control of the
lower classes. This perspective sees the unemployed as "social dynamite," a
"dangerous class," whose threats to "respectable" society translate into
salient political pressures to toughen the criminal justice system generally.
Alternatively, increased numbers of unemployed people may pose a greater
challenge to the always contradictory and tenuous ideology of equality and
opportunity on which contemporary market economies and their
accompanying political systems depend for legitimacy. In this light,
increases in unemployment necessitate more frequent and intensive use of
incarceration in order to maintain constant levels of social control.119
A third line of thought locates the connection between unemployment
and incarceration in the intersection of ideology and human agency. By this
view, judges and prosecutors express through more severe decision making
the heightened anxieties and fears generated by increases in
unemployment.12 In particular, elite internalization of a sense of crisis is the
medium that translates higher unemployment into greater incarceration.121
What is notable about this approach is that, like the more structural accounts
just mentioned, it is not dependent on any notion of official conspiracy on
behalf of the upper classes; neither does it assume an unmediated
relationship between labor dynamics and criminal justice. Instead, it
invokes the subtle role of culture, ideology, and politics in translating class
interests into official decision-making. 22
The differences among these perspectives reflect a deeper question about
the relative importance of social structure versus human agency (including
politics, law, and culture) in shaping modern society. Suffice to say that
structure and agency represent complementary dynamics and the course of
history reflects their complex interplay. 123 The view in this Article is that
social structure plays a key role in conditioning more conscious behaviors
within the criminal justice system. Such structures establish an evolving
framework in which criminal justice responses are ordered and from which
119. A notable example of this type of scholarship seeks to explain the expansion in federal
criminal liability over the past couple of decades as a calculated effort to deflect public attention
from social problems and failed economic policies. See generally David E. Barlow et al., The
Political Economy of Criminal Justice Policy: A Time-Series Analysis of Economic Conditions,
Crime, and Federal Criminal Justice Legislation 1948-1987, 13 JUST. Q. 223 (1996).
120. Chiricos & Delone, supra note 116, at 424-26.
121. See, e.g., Dario Melossi, Changing Representations of the Criminal, 40 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 296, 298-99 (2000).
122. See generally STEVEN Box, RECESSION, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1987).
123. See, e.g., Reiman, supra note 105, at 115-17.
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they derive their rationality and coherence. It is for this reason unnecessary
to choose from among these possible connections between incarceration and
unemployment a single one that is correct. Instead, each offers a
complementary account of how conditions of surplus labor are translated
into higher rates of imprisonment-or how, for that matter, a "neutral"
system of criminal justice, ostensibly committed to protecting victims and
punishing wrongdoers, and relatively devoid of conspiratorial elements,
could actually exert more general dynamics of social control over the lower
classes.
2. Labor Discipline and Social Marginality
In its purest form, Rusche and Kirchheimer's labor control thesis
suggests not only a very direct causal relationship between unemployment
rates and incarceration rates, but also a proportional relationship between
these phenomena over time. This presents an apparent difficulty in the face
of dramatic increases in incarceration rates over the past three decades,
which have not been preceded by comparable increases either in
unemployment rates or, for that matter, crimes committed. 24 Rather than
falsifying Rusche and Kirchheimer's thesis, though, this apparent problem
with their thesis has inspired a closer consideration of the link between
unemployment and incarceration, which has in turn led to the elucidation of
another, more nuanced and perhaps more important dimension of the
criminal justice system's social control function.
In essence, the thesis that has emerged is that through punishment and
deterrence, the criminal justice system serves an active, labor-disciplining
function which operates alongside its more passive labor control function.
As Dario Melossi has been keen to remind, this thesis is actually already
implicit in Rusche and Kirchheimer's project. 25 It involves two mutually
supporting processes: one directly coercive and tied in with the principle of
lesser eligibility; the other coercive in a relatively softer, more "educative"
sense and realized not strictly by the threat of punishment, but by the
criminal justice system's internal structures of socialization.
124. See generally George C. Galster & Laure A. Scaturo, The U.S. Criminal Justice
System: Unemployment and the Severity of Punishment, 22 J. RES. ON CRIME & DELINQ. 163
(1985). On the tenuous relationship between this increase in incarceration and crime rates, see
generally Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996, in
26 CRIME AND JUSTICE: PRISONS 17 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999).
125. Dario Melossi, Introduction to RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 108, at ix, xxiii-
xxviii; see also GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 98, at 93-96.
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While the first of these processes is similar in conception to conventional
notions of deterrence, the idea here is not that the criminal justice system
uses the threat of imprisonment to deter criminality as such. Rather, by
punishment and the threat of punishment, the criminal justice system
accomplishes the more subtle function of deterring the poor from falling out
of the working class, embracing deviant forms of employment, or otherwise
eschewing the legitimate norms of capitalist society. Punishment practices
(most commonly, incarceration) can be seen as coercive mechanisms that
respond to qualitative conditions of employment and the demand,
articulated by economic elites through the criminal justice system that
workers "perform" within the traditional economy notwithstanding these
conditions. As Melossi puts it, punishment is entwined with the prevailing
"economy of performance" of society. 2 6 "When performance demands
increase, the area of human behavior that is punished (and the general
severity of punishment) will also increase. The opposite happens when
performance demands decrease."' 127 In this respect, punishment "functions
as a sort of 'gazette of morality. ' , 128 By this view, punishment is not simply
correlated with labor surplus, which is Rusche and Kirchheimer's thesis; it
is more generally entwined with class conflict, and in particular the need to
maintain relatively quiescent labor market participation.
This notion parallels the thesis developed by the historian Douglas Hay.
Hay famously argues that in eighteenth-century England, the criminal
justice system "was critically important in maintaining bonds of obedience
and deference, in legitimizing the status quo, [and] in constantly recreating
the structure of authority which arose from property and in turn protected its
interests"-all under conditions of economic change and general social
crisis. 129 This was achieved by a regime of punishment that combined, in
highly ritualized and discretionary ways, real punishments, symbolic
punishments, and threats of punishment. In fact, reminding of the
importance of context to the issues, Hay concerns himself not only with
punishment, but also with an assortment of criminal justice institutions and
doctrines. He describes how elites could use the institutions to advance a
complex ideology of order, hierarchy, and property rights that retained the
appearance of a universal good, while actually aggressively disciplining
("terrorizing") the lower classes into compliance with the social order.
126. Melossi, Gazette of Morality and Social Whip, supra note 118, at 262.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE:
CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17, 25 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975).
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Hay's argument may be regarded narrowly, as a somewhat controversial
claim about the course of development of eighteenth-century England's
criminal justice system. 130 But it can also be seen as a broader reflection on
the subtle ways that the criminal justice system can exert social control over
the lower classes. By stressing that social control under the criminal justice
system does not always mean direct control, and that threats, symbols, and
other messages short of actual punishment can be just as important in
regulating the behavior of the lower classes, Hay offers a compelling way to
understand the social control functions of the criminal justice system where
overt mechanisms of class domination and class exploitation have often
been substantially displaced by more subtle ones.
In fact, with some notable exceptions, the most overt, instrumentalist
means of disciplining labor via the criminal justice system are rarely
observed today. Yet, this disciplinary function continues to characterize the
role of the criminal justice system in contemporary society, albeit usually in
the more subtle ways that concern Hay. Today, rather than transparent
schemes of old, such as leasing convicts to private business or auctioning
off vagrants to those in need of labor, it is the threat of incarceration that
serves most often to discipline labor. Those who refuse to support
themselves by accepting legitimate wage labor at its market rates face harsh
sentences if they turn instead to crime for support. This dilemma captures
the reality of everyday life for many lower class people, for whom crime
presents a real alternative to unemployment, underemployment, and
relentless poverty-an alternative made all the more appealing by recent,
deleterious changes in the structure of work, the availability of welfare, and
the overall condition of the lower class.' That most lower class people do
not regularly resort to crime, even in the face of such abject social
marginality, or that they themselves may have strong commitments to the
harsh treatment of criminals, hardly disproves this claim, as many
conservatives suggest. Instead, such apparent complications merely show
130. Hay's historical claims have drawn criticism from those, like John Langbein and Peter
King, intent to show that valid considerations of morality and democracy, and not dynamics of
class conflict, informed the patterns uncovered by Hay. Whatever their merits, these claims are
less important than the broader inquiry Hay's work has invited into the role of ideology,
symbolism, and informal practices in constituting the class control functions of criminal law and
criminal punishment. On this debate, see GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra
note 98, at 118-24.
131. See JOHN HAGEDORN WiTH PERRY MACON, PEOPLE AND FOLKS: GANGS, CRIME AND
THE UNDERCLASS IN A RUSTBELT CITY 101-05, 118-27 (1988); JAY MACLEOD, AIN'T No
MAKIN' IT: ASPIRATIONS AND ATTAINMENT IN A LOW-INCOME NEIGHBORHOOD 31-33, 177-79
(1987). See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1996); Stephen W.
Baron, Street Youth Labour Market Experiences and Crime, 38 CAN. REV. SOC. &
ANTHROPOLOGY 189 (2001).
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that this disciplinary function actually works quite well in socializing
acceptance of the prevailing social order and of the means by which it
replicates itself. 1
32
In the light of this thesis, criminal justice emerges as a way of directly
regulating surplus labor-the Rusche and Kirchheimer thesis-and also as a
means of containing class conflict, controlling social marginality, and
affirming the sanctity of wage labor and private property. This agenda is
carried out by a complex array of institutional responses with varying
degrees of directness: the warehousing by imprisonment of surplus labor;
the control, both directly and symbolically (in the parlance of justification
theory, the deterrence) of dissent and other acts, like riot or theft, that
threaten social order; and, even more diffusely, the use of the entire edifice
of crime and punishment to articulate Melossi' s gazette of morality.
Compounding these disciplinary effects is the role of the modem prison
in actually training inmates to submit to modem structures of workplace
authority, labor management, and private life. Although also suggested in
the work of Rusche and Kirchheimer,'33 this thesis is made perhaps most
forcefully by Michael Ignatieff. Ignatieff shows how, under the aegis of
liberal, "humanitarian" reformism, the prison was constructed around the
relentless and often brutal inculcation of industrial labor values-around a
campaign, as he puts it at one point, "to implant the inner disciplinarians of
guilt and compunction in working-class consciences.' 34 While his initial
emphasis is historical and English, Ignatieff proposes that this disciplinary
orientation, which he regards as so vital to wresting labor market
compliance from "free" people, remains a defining characteristic of the
contemporary prison in the Western world-a point we will explore later.
Equally clear is that these functions are not confined to actual
imprisonment; they are just as aggressively advanced by intermediate
sanctions, especially probation and parole, which typically encourage labor
market participation by the threat of actual incarceration.135
132. On concerns about labor discipline and social discipline generally in the rise of the
politics of law and order, see CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA 3-13, 29-44, 238-42
(1999).
133. RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 108, at 63, 107; see also GARLAND, PUNISHMENT
AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 98, at 95. Cf DARIO MELOSSI & MASSIMO PAVARINI, THE
PRISON AND THE FACTORY: ORIGINS OF THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM 40-41, 50-51 (Glynis
Cousin trans., Barnes & Noble Books 1981) (1977).
134. MICHAEL IGNATEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION, 1750-1850, at 212-13 (1978).
135. See generally JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL
OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890-1990 (1993).
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3. Policing and the Control of the Lower Classes
The criminal justice system's social control function extends to policing
as well. According to most authorities, the police evolved from the very
outset not as arbiters of crime control and public safety, but as agents in the
construction and maintenance of social order under capitalism. 136 From the
beginning, the main functions of the police centered around what Mark
Neocleous calls the "consolidation of the social power of capital and the
wage form"; this extended to the "fabrication of ... wage labour" via the
suppression of archaic or otherwise unacceptable modes of employment, the
securing of capitalist forms of property and the social hierarchies built upon
them, and the maintenance of spatial boundaries among the classes.
137
Whether this class control agenda characterizes modem police is more
controversial. Several notable scholars including Theodore Ferdinand,
Eugene Watts, and especially Eric Monkkonen, have argued that the period
from the end of the nineteenth century through the beginning of the
twentieth century marked a shift in police functions away from social
control to crime control.'38 By pointing to evidence of general decline of
more obvious instances of class policing-for example, strike breaking and
harassment of tramps--combined with a new emphasis on "real" or serious
crime, and by appealing to the very plausible notion that the consolidation
of industrial capitalism and the growing effectiveness of other means of
social control rendered class control by the police obsolete, this crime
control thesis seems to present a compelling challenge to the view of
contemporary police as agents of class based social control.
Nevertheless, a number of scholars, including not only Neocleous but
also social scientists Helen Boritch and John Hagan and legal historian
Sidney Harring, have countered that the real transition in the nature of
police power over this period was from transparent and explicit, to less
136. See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920, at 30-64 (Robert
Fogel & Stephan Thernstrom eds., 1981); cf Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, The Origin
and Evolution of the Police Function in Society: Notes Toward a Theory, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
109 (1987). See generally WILBUR R. MILLER, Cops AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW
YORK AND LONDON, 1830-1870 (1973); Roger Lane, Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth-
Century America, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (Norval Morris
& Michael Tonry eds., 1980)
137. NEOCLEOUS, supra note 105, at xii-xiii.
138. See MONKKONEN, supra note 136, at 156-61; Theodore N. Ferdinand, From a Service
to a Legalistic Style Police Department: A Case Study, 4 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 302, 304-12
(1976); Eugene J. Watts, Police Response to Crime and Disorder in Twentieth-Century St.
Louis, 70 J. AM. HIST. 340, 351-58 (1983). See generally Nathan Douthit, Police
Professionalism and the War Against Crime in the United States, 1920s-30s, in 2 POLICE
FORCES IN HISTORY 317 (George L. Mosse ed., 1975).
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transparent and more subtle, forms of class repression. They argue that the
embrace of norms of crime control, professionalism, and to some extent rule
of law values, which seems so clearly to mark their transition to crime
control, actually allowed the police to better legitimate and better conceal
their class control functions while imposing no great restraints on what the
police actually do. Moreover, these scholars contend, the consolidation of
industrial capitalism, with its near universalization of wage labor and its
entrenchment of notions of legality, did relieve the police of many of the
more active obligations of class control, leaving them to perform more
passive, less visible, and seemingly more neutral functions in maintaining
bourgeois order. 13
9
A central claim of this critical scholarship is that the act of "neutrally"
enforcing the criminal law often constitutes an exercise in the control of the
lower classes by the police.' 4° Facially neutral laws, apparently keyed to
protecting consensual interests and values, are enforced by the police in
ways that implicate the lower classes and that allow the state to assert
special control over their lives. The social control activity of the police is
not limited to formal law enforcement. Indeed, the police actually spend
relatively little in the way of time and resources enforcing the criminal
law.14 1 Much of their work consists of informal (sometimes extralegal)
139. NEOCLEOUS, supra note 105, at 63-118. Sidney Harring relies on his study of urban
policing in the period between the Civil War and the First World War specifically to refute the
crime control thesis. HARRING, POLICING A CLASS SOCIETY, supra note 107, at 3-4. Harring
argues that the "police institution ... [in] its modem form emerged from class struggle under
industrial capitalism" and remains "essentially the same" now as it was in the late nineteenth
century. Id. at 3. For Harring too, professionalization, the adoption of rule of law norms, as well
as bureaucratization and the overall de-politicization of policing, were all adopted in ways that
enhanced the legitimacy of the police and so actually improved their ability to control the lower
classes. Id. at 247-58. What the police actually did, according to Harring, entailed both dramatic
undertakings, like strike-breaking and the persecution of radicals, and seemingly mundane
operations, like the cultivation of work ethics, thriftiness, and other bourgeois values, often in
the guise of enforcing "public order" offenses. Id. at 49-60, 147-48, 198-200, 222-23. And of
course, there was also the general mandate of protecting property. Id. passim. A very similar
rejoinder to the Monkkonen thesis is offered by Helen Boritch and John Hagan in their study of
almost a century of policing in Toronto. Boritch and Hagan argue that Monkkonen draws too
rigid and arbitrary a distinction between class control functions and genuine criminal
enforcement. Helen Boritch & John Hagan, Crime and the Changing Forms of Class Control:
Policing Public Order in "Toronto the Good," 1859-1955, 66 Soc. FORCES 307, 313-15, 330-
31 (1987). They perform an empirical analysis of Toronto policing records which suggest less a
shift from class control to crime control than "an ongoing historical synthesis in the class and
crime control functions of the police." Id. at 309-10, 331.
140. Nicholas R. Fyfe, Policing the City, 32 URB. STUD. 759, 766-67 (1995).
141. NEOCLEOUS, supra note 105, at 93-94. As Neocleous puts it, "criminal law
enforcement is something that most police officers do with the frequency located somewhere
between virtually never and very rarely." Id. at 93. Although the issue is controversial, police
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interventions against, and sometimes on behalf of, the poor: responding to
accidents and mediating non-criminal disputes; monitoring the entry of the
poor into affluent neighborhoods and important commercial districts;
challenging loiterers, trespassers, and other suspicious persons; and
confining prostitutes, hustlers, and other peddlers of deviant goods to areas
suitably remote from upper class life.'42 Police personnel themselves
sometimes identify this project of policing the boundaries of class as their
central function. 143
IV. THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE RULE OF
LAW'S FATE IN MODERN SOCIETY
The social welfare system and the criminal justice system are not
mutually exclusive institutions of social control. Quite the contrary, the
history of the twentieth century shows clearly that they have often
discharged their social control functions in parallel, often complementary
fashion. Nevertheless, through much of this period-especially from the
1940s through the 1970s-the social welfare system occupied the dominant
role in this regard. Consistent with this asymmetrical relationship, through
this period the social welfare system expanded fairly steadily in overall size
and in the relative comprehensiveness of its protections, while the criminal
justice system remained relatively small in scale, and its methods
increasingly invested in welfarist tendencies. Beginning in the early 1970s,
however, this relationship between the social welfare system and the
criminal justice system began to undergo an inversion that would first
install the criminal justice system as the dominant, and the social welfare
system as the subordinate, system of social control of the lower classes.
Second, it would establish a punitive orientation as the dominant motif of
social control in virtually all respects-purging the criminal justice system
of its welfarist tendencies and installing ever more punitive tendencies in
what has remained of the social welfare system. This Part describes this
change in the dominant form of social control in some detail. It draws on
this to explain the deterioration of rule of law norms. And with a focus on
the role of fiscal crisis, ideology, and the overall political economy of
may spend most of their time on non-criminal functions. RICHARD V. ERICSON, REPRODUCING
ORDER: A STUDY OF POLICE PATROLWORK, 52-55 (1982); Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-
Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. Soc. REV. 699, 700-04 (1967).
142. See Fyfe, supra note 140, at 764-65; cf MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ 223-60, 267-
316 (Vintage Books 1992) (1990).
143. See, e.g., ANTHONY V. BOUZA, POLICE UNBOUND 73-74 (2001); Fyfe, supra note 140,
at 760.
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contemporary America, it also undertakes to explain why this process has
unfolded.
A. The Relationship Between the Social Welfare System and the Criminal
Justice System as Modes of Social Control
From the very outset, two very basic factors suggest a surrogate
relationship between the social welfare system and the criminal justice
system. First, their agendas of social control have a shared focus on the
lower classes. Second, these agendas are roughly directed to the same key
missions: the direct management of surplus labor; the prosecution of an
agenda of moral training centered on labor discipline; and the general goal
of policing the habits of the poor-all with the aim of socializing,
politicizing, and legalizing the dysfunctions of capitalism and the class
conflict that is embedded in these dysfunctions.
Of course the forms by which each articulates this agenda are very
different. However pernicious the social control dimensions of the social
welfare system vis- -vis the lower classes, as we have seen, it prosecutes its
agenda in a relatively soft fashion. Participation in the social welfare system
is at least formally optional; coercion is largely by denial of support to the
needy, not by positive forms of punishment. Pernicious features aside, the
social welfare system's overall program is generally rooted in a left-liberal
agenda steeped in progressive, egalitarian, even humanistic values. All of
this distinguishes the social welfare system from the criminal justice
system, which is by its very nature premised on the coercive application of
force and violence. While post-war/pre-1970s penology and criminality
often embraced welfarist themes (disingenuously, according to many),' 44 the
logic of the contemporary criminal justice system is overtly coercive,
inegalitarian, separatist, indeed fundamentally reactionary. 145 For these
reasons, the criminal justice system has been aptly described as a hard or
"right-handed" (as opposed to soft or "left-handed") mode of controlling the
lower classes.'46
144. By the 1970s a full-blown critique of welfarist criminal justice policies had emerged,
primarily from leftists who stressed how welfarist themes rationalized the system's social
control functions. See generally STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME,
PUNISHMENT AND CLASSIFICATION (1985).
145. On the contemporary criminal justice system's embrace of these values, see generally
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001) [hereinafter GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL].
146. On the right-handed/left-handed distinction, see PIERRE BORDIEU, The Left Hand and
the Right Hand of the State, LE MONDE, Jan. 14, 1992, reprinted in ACTS OF RESISTANCE 1
(Richard Nice trans., New Press 1998).
802 [Ariz. St. LTJ
RULE OF LA W'S UNCERTAIN FATE
The shift from the social welfare system to the criminal justice system as
the dominant mode of social control has been of enormous importance to
the fate of the rule of law in contemporary society. But I do not wish to
suggest that this shift has been absolute. Rather, it is characterized by the
newfound hegemony, not the absolute dominance, of the criminal justice
system, and by the diffusion of a much more punitive logic within each
mode of social control. On one level, this has occurred by the retrenchment
of the social welfare system in parallel with the expansion of the criminal
justice system, with the functions formerly discharged by the latter
increasingly taken over by the former. On another level, this shift has taken
political and ideological form in changes in the relative prestige and
legitimacy of each mode of control.
B. The Retrenchment of the Social Welfare System
Born tentatively out of the Progressive Era and the Great Depression, the
American social welfare system continued to evolve in fits and starts
through the first three decades of the postwar era. 147 In the period from the
1960s through the early 1970s, spurred by the "War on Poverty," the system
expanded dramatically. 48 By the early 1970s, the American social welfare
system consisted of a number of key programs, all in some degree
mandated, funded, or administered by the federal government: relatively
comprehensive social insurance; public relief in the form of income
supports; subsidized housing; food assistance, particularly via the food
stamp program; various health insurance programs, particularly for the
elderly and disabled; as well as minimum wage standards and
unemployment insurance. Along with this expansion in areas of coverage
came lower eligibility thresholds, which entitled more people to receive
147. Although the New Deal only begat, in Michael Katz' words, a "semiwelfare state," it
did dramatically expand welfare programs of all sorts: social insurance, including retirement
and unemployment benefits; work relief; outdoor relief; transient services; and housing support.
KATZ, supra note 91, at 224-55. The centerpiece of this program was the creation of the Social
Security System. Id. at 242-50. The New Deal was particularly significant for federalizing for
the first time the main agencies of welfare. Id. at 225-27. On the evolution of the social welfare
system, see generally PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 85.
148. Between 1965 and 1972, federal spending on social welfare increased from $75 billion
to $185 billion. KATZ, supra note 91, at 266. This increase in funding was aimed primarily at
programs that increased the magnitude of relief available, especially Aid to Families with
Dependent Children and government assisted housing, that improved access to health care and
nutrition, and that promoted "opportunity" (principally by training and education) and
community-based responses to the ills of lower class life. Id. at 269-82. In many, but not all,
instances, eligibility requirements were also loosened. Id. at 270.
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benefits, greater benefits within these programs, 149 and the erosion of racial
barriers to eligibility. 50 This expansion of the social welfare system was not
insignificant to the condition of the lower classes, whose standards of living
and life opportunities were improved considerably.'51
These positive features did not, however, obviate the system's
problematic aspects, which went well beyond either social control functions
or the affronts to the rule of law which we have mentioned. Even at its
height, the social welfare system remained an irrational patchwork of
programs, unresponsive to the basic needs of many members of the lower
classes, and able to mitigate but not substantially eliminate unemployment,
poverty, and social marginality. Consistent with its function as an institution
of social control rather than of genuine social reform, the system that
emerged was by all appearances designed to leave intact existing
distributions of economic power, wealth, and social privilege.' Despite its
liberalization, the social welfare system never abandoned its array of
restrictive, disciplinary eligibility requirements, and never offered an
attractive alternative to any but the worst kinds of work. Moreover, those
parts of the social welfare system that most directly benefit the lower
classes-public assistance, food aid, and public housing-were never more
than a small share of government expenditures.'53 A number of programs,
including social and unemployment insurance, have consistently been
funded by regressive taxation.
The enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA") constitutes the definitive moment
149. As a result of these changes, for example, the number of families drawing the primary
form of public assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), increased by
several fold between 1960 and 1972. In 1960, 787,000 families received AFDC benefits, and by
1972, 3,049,000 did. Admin. for Children & Families, Cash Assistance for Needy Families,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/stats/3697.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Cash
Assistance]. Over that same period, the percentage of the United States population "on welfare"
increased from less than two percent to over five percent. Admin. for Children & Families,
Percentage of the U.S. Population on Welfare Since 1960, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/
stats/6090_ch2.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
150. Boris, supra note 89, at 29-32.
151. KATZ, supra note 91, at 262-63, 278; see also Sar A. Levitan & Robert Taggart, The
Great Society Did Succeed, 91 POL. SCI. Q. 601, 603-613 (1976-77). See generally ROBERT H.
HAVEMAN, A DECADE OF FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS: ACHIEVEMENTS, FAILURES, AND
LESSONS (Robert H. Haveman ed., 1977).
152. KATZ, supra note 91, at 263.
153. Id. at 242-43, 246-47. A rigid distinction between social insurance and public
assistance was built into the social welfare system from the time of its modem formulation in
the 1930s. Id. at 245-47. By the 1970s, the vast majority of government spending on welfare
was flowing to those not in the lower classes. Id. at 275-76.
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in the retrenchment of the social welfare system. 154 PRWORA almost
completely "devolved" to the states the role of administering public
assistance; it restricted immigrants' eligibility for several forms of benefits;
it restricted eligibility for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"); it time-
limited food stamp eligibility and denied food stamps to broad categories of
people, particularly "able bodied" people without children; and perhaps
most notably, the act completely eliminated the main vehicle of income
support, Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), replacing it
with Temporary Aid for Needy Families ("TANF"), a time-limited program
that requires "workfare" or job training participation as conditions of
eligibility. With regard to this last change, the statute also gave states
incentives to encourage workfare participation and to reduce overall welfare
roles; it allowed the states to cap benefit levels and to delegate
administrative functions to private charities and churches; and it also
featured an array of rules relative to the discouragement of single
motherhood.155 As one authority sums it up, "PRWORA totally reorganized
federal/state relations on welfare requirements[,] thereby ending a sixty-
year-old federal entitlement system designed to provide a safety net for
America's poor."'
156
In line with its explicit purposes, which include "end[ing] the
dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job
preparation, work, and marriage" and renouncing individual "entitlement"
to government assistance, 157 the Act has reduced considerably the number of
public assistance beneficiaries as well as overall levels of welfare
"dependency."' 58 Moreover, most of those who "left" the welfare roles in
154. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5, 7, 21, 25 & 42 U.S.C.).
155. For an overview of the Act's main features, see BRENDON O'CONNOR, A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE SYSTEM: WHEN IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES 228-35
(2004) [hereinafter O'CONNOR, A POLITICAL HISTORY]. See generally Gail P. Dave et al.,
Development in Policy: Welfare Reform, 16 YALE L. & POL' Y REV. 221 (1997).
156. O'CONNOR, A POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 155, at 226.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2)(b) (2000). The Act's other stated purposes were all concerned
with enforcing a traditional family structure. See id. § 601(a)(1)-(4). On the decline in food
stamps, see DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE:
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2002, at 11-15 tbl.IND 3b (2003) [hereinafter INDICATORS OF
WELFARE DEPENDENCE]; see also Marcia Bok & Louise Simmons, Post-Welfare Reform, Low-
Income Families and the Dissolution of the Social Safety Net, 23 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 217,
220-21 (2002).
158. INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE, supra note 157, at 1-7 tbl.SUM 1, 11-5 tbl.IND
lb (showing decline in number of beneficiaries and percentage dependant on AFDC/TANF,
food stamps, and Supplemental Security Income in aftermath of PRWORA); id. at 11-13 tbl.IND
3a (showing decrease of one quarter in the percentage of population receiving AFDC/TANF
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the Act's aftermath were apparently forced off by deterrent and
disqualifying provisions. 59 In addition to reducing public assistance
caseloads, PRWORA also reduced caseloads for ancillary benefits, like
food stamps, Medicaid, and child care services-a phenomenon observers
ascribe more to the new statute's intimidating tone than its formal effects on
eligibility. 60 PRWORA also seems to have worked much better at
diminishing caseloads than either reducing poverty (which was not among
its formally stated purposes) or integrating beneficiaries into the
workforce. 161
Despite its practical and symbolic significance, PRWORA was not the
beginning of welfare reform. Beginning much earlier, statutory and
administrative reforms designed to restrict public assistance eligibility and
reduce caseloads as well as benefit amounts were regularly adopted and
even more regularly proposed. 162 In addition to this, overall funding was
reduced both for actual benefits and for administration. 63 As a result, the
percentage of Americans receiving public assistance was kept largely
constant from the 1970s until the passage of the 1996 legislation ---despite
the fact that during this same period before PRWORA, average AFDC
benefits per recipient fell considerably.'65 Throughout this period, Congress
between 1970 and 1999); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2003, at 371 tbl.563 (2003); Cash Assistance, supra note 149.
159. And many of these people have suffered great hardship. Karen A. Curtis, Financial
Penalties Under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program: Policy Discourse and
Strategies for Reform, 23 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 239, 240 (2002).
160. Bok & Simmons, supra note 157, at 223-29.
161. See, e.g., id. at 221-31; Sylke Nissen, Control and Marginalization: Federal and
Local Welfare Politics in New York City, 32 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 246-47 (2000).
162. On the key role of the Reagan administration in fomenting an aggressive assault on
welfare, see generally FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR:
REAGAN'S ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1982) [hereinafter PIVEN
& CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR]. Restrictive reforms were often initiated by the states,
which throughout the history of American welfare have retained considerable authority over
these matters, even where federal programs are concerned. KATZ, supra note 91, at 292-95. An
expanded emphasis on work within the welfare system was an area of unsuccessful attempts at
reform under President Carter. See, e.g., Desmond King, Sectionalism and Policy Formation in
the United States: President Carter's Welfare Initiatives, 26 BRIT. J. POL. SCi. 337, 345-51
(1996). On reform efforts leading up to the 1996 Act, see Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families,
and Bureaucrats: A Prehistory of Welfare Reform, 14 J.L. & POL. 225, 280-98 (1998).
163. INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE, supra note 157, at A-10 tbl.TANF 3. On the
scale of funding cuts in the 1980s, see KATZ, supra note 91, at 297.
164. Admin. for Children & Families, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
Percent of Total U.S. Population, 1960-1999, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/stats/6097rf.htm
(last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
165. INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE, supra note 157, at A-7 fig.TANF 2, A-13
tbl.TANF 6.
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and the presidency also undertook several times to give states more
authority to "enforce work among recipients, to exclude certain types of
applicants [from] assistance, and to establish new mechanisms of
surveillance." 1
66
Other aspects of the social welfare system were rolled back prior to
PRWORA. Even before PRWORA, the value of unemployment insurance
programs had begun to decline, such that today these programs provide
substantially less support than several decades ago. 167 A similar trajectory
characterizes other programs. With increases becoming rarer and more
modest, the federal minimum wage is at its lowest point in real dollars in
over forty years and is thirty percent below its peak value in 1968.168
Through the 1980s and 1990s, subsidized housing programs were cut back
and public housing tenants subjected to all manner of draconian conditions
of eligibility and occupancy.169 These developments are especially
significant because they have a more direct effect on lower class males, who
have never been generally entitled to public assistance programs like
AFDC, but whose labor market participation and adherence to conventional
norms have been most tenuous. Also notable is that the only social welfare
program that has expanded appreciably over the last several decades, the
Earned Income Tax Credit program, effectively requires labor market
participation as a condition of eligibility.170
166. Yvonne Zylan & Sarah A. Soule, Ending Welfare as We Know It (Again): Welfare
State Retrenchment, 1989-1995, 79 Soc. FORCES 623, 624, 628-29 (2000). In fact, the
government experimented with work requirements in the 1960s. Boris, supra note 89, at 29-30.
167. On the increasing inadequacy of unemployment insurance programs, see, for example,
MAURICE EMSELLEM ET AL., ECON. POL'Y INST., FAILING THE UNEMPLOYED: A STATE BY STATE
EXAMINATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEMS 1-10 (2002); Heather Boushey &
Jeffrey Wenger, Coming Up Short: Current Unemployment Insurance Benefits Fail to Meet
Basic Family Needs, EPI ISSUE BRIEF No. 169, Oct. 31, 2001, at 1-5.
168. Edith Rasel et al., Step Up, Not Out: The Case for Raising the Federal Minimum Wage
for Workers in Every State, EPI ISSUE BRIEF No. 149, Feb. 7, 2001, at 1-2.
169. The overall trend in public housing over the last three decades entails an overall
stagnation in public housing stock (including subsidized housing) as well as a focus on
subsidization of private housing stock. See, e.g., MASON C. DOAN, AMERICAN HOUSING
PRODUCTION 1880-2000: A CONCISE HISTORY, 156-57, 191-92 tbl.F (1997); R. ALLEN HAYS,
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING: IDEOLOGY AND CHANGE IN PUBLIC POLICY
passim (2d ed. 1995); PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE? 74-99 (1994); see
also Roger Biles, Epilogue to FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES 265, 265-69 (John F.
Bauman et al. eds., 2000). On eligibility and occupancy rles, see Michael A. Cavanagh & M.
Jason Williams, Low-Income Grandparents as the Newest Draftees in the Government's War on
Drugs: A Legal and Rhetorical Analysis of Department of Housing and Urban Development v.
Rucker, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 157, 158-60 (2003).
170. For an overview of the features and functions of the Earned Income Tax Credit, see
SAUL D. HOFFMAN & LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, HELPING WORKING FAMILIES: THE EARNED
INCOME TAx CREDIT (2003).
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Predictably, this long process of retrenchment has imposed considerable
social costs on the lower classes. Official poverty rates, which in some
respects tend to discount contemporary levels of poverty, show that poverty
declined steadily during the post-war era through the mid 1970s, but has not
decreased appreciably since then.'71 Neither has the prevalence of "deep
poverty" among those at the lowest end of the income scale.172 Moreover,
over the last thirty years poverty has become more concentrated in center
cities with only recent indications of a diffusion into suburban areas; 173 and,
like virtually all social problems incidental to the retrenchment of the social
welfare system, poverty has also remained especially concentrated among
blacks and single women with children. 74 Following a long period of
postwar improvement, in the 1970s real wages entered a prolonged period
of stagnation and relative decline. 175 This has led to the "working poor"
phenomenon, characterized by active labor market participation that does
not lead out of poverty.176 Over the same period, overall economic
171. ROBERT POLLIN, CONTOURS OF DESCENT: U.S. ECONOMIC FRACTURES AND THE
LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL AUSTERITY 45-47 (2003); BERNADETrE D. PROCTOR & JOSEPH
DALAKER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2002, at 3-4 fig. 1 (2003). In particular, the official measure, which is consumption- (as
opposed to income-) based and indexed to food prices, has not been regularly updated to
account for changes in consumption and labor patterns, household composition, or relative
inequality. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH 1-15
(Constance F. Citro & Robert T. Michael eds., 1995); Thomas Corbett, Poverty: Improving the
Measure After Thirty Years (A Conference), 20 Focus 51, 51 (1999); Robert K. Triest, Has
Poverty Gotten Worse?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97-100 (1998).
172. INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE, supra note 157, at 111-7 tbl.ECON 2
(measuring by the percentage of the population with incomes less than fifty percent of the
poverty line).
173. See ALAN BERUBE & WILLIAM H. FREY, BROOKINGS INST., A DECADE OF MIXED
BLESSINGS: URBAN AND SUBURBAN POVERTY IN CENSUS 2000, at 1-3, 12 (2002); PAUL A.
JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY 29-58
(1997). See generally Lincoln Quillian, Migration Patterns and the Growth of High-Poverty
Neighborhoods, 1970-1990, 105 AM. J. Soc. 1 (1999).
174. On the persistence of high poverty rates and other dynamics of inequality among
blacks, see, for example, Taryn Lindhorst & Ron Mancoske, Race, Gender and Class
Inequalities in Welfare Reform, 10 RACE GENDER & CLASS 27 (2003). On the persistence of
high poverty rates and other dynamics of inequality among single women with children, see
KATHRYN H. PORTER & ALLEN DUPREE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POVERTY
TRENDS FOR FAMILIES HEADED BY WORKING SINGLE MOTHERS, 1993 TO 1999, at 6-7 (2001).
175. See, e.g., POLLIN, supra note 171, at 42-45 tbl.2.7, fig.2.1; Jared Bernstein &
Lawrence Mishel, Has Wage Inequality Stopped Growing?, MONTHLY LAB. REV., 3, 8 chart 3
(1997). Significantly, the percentage of the officially poor who work full time has also increased
significantly and steadily since the 1970s. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables,
tbl. 18, http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpovl 8.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
176. See, e.g., Bok & Simmons, supra note 157, at 233-34. See generally KATHERINE S.
NEWMAN, No SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING POOR IN THE INNER CITY (Vintage 2000).
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inequality began a dramatic increase, 7 7 food insecurity and hunger
remained entrenched problems for a substantial minority of people, 7 8 and
homelessness, vagrancy, and begging all returned to the fore as common
features on the contemporary American landscape. 179 By every indication,
though, retrenchment policies are likely to continue to unfold.180
C. The Transformation of the Criminal Justice System and the Erosion of
the Rule of Law
While the social welfare system has fallen into retrenchment, the
criminal justice system has moved in a radically different direction. Over
the last several decades, the criminal justice system has undergone a
massive transformation, expanding dramatically its overall domain and
intensifying its expressions of sovereignty. In the course of this
transformation, the criminal justice system has retreated from an earlier,
belated embrace of rule of law norms, reflected in the civil liberties
revolution of the 1960s and early 1970s, to return to a state of conflict with
these norms. This development is particularly significant given the intensity
of sovereignty in the criminal justice context.
The idea of the sovereignty of law embodied in legality and legal
generality directly implies the familiar principles, nulla cimen sine lege and
nulla peona sine lege. Moreover, as our earlier discussion makes clear,
generality presupposes separation of powers and is inconsistent with the
retroactive assertions of criminal justice authority, and with excessively
individualized, vague, or discretionary definitions of criminality. Generality
also commands adherence to principles of formal equality under the law as
well as the administration and adjudication of criminal law in accordance
with regular procedures.
Of course the actual fulfillment of these normative commitments
depends upon the circumscription of criminal justice functions by an array
of positive legal rules. Generality and legality must be embodied in
177. See, e.g., DANIEL H. WEINBERG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, A BRIEF LOOK AT POSTWAR U.S. INCOME INEQUALITY 1 (1996).
178. See MARK NORD ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2001 (2003); see also INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE, supra note 157,
at 111-19, tbls.ECON 8a & 8b.
179. On the role of welfare retrenchment, among other structural causes, in the resurgence
of homelessness, see JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES 33-
90 (1992).
180. O'CONNOR, A POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 155, at 251-57; Robert Pear &
Raymond Hernandez, Campaign Politics Seen as Bottleneck for Welfare Law, N.Y. TIMES, June
6, 2004, at Al.
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conceptions of non-retroactivity, separation of powers, equal protection, and
due process that are not just juridical principles but doctrines by which
exercises of state power can be challenged. Likewise, the law must govern
the state's assertion of claims of criminal suspicion, liability, and desert of
punishment upon which its sovereignty rests, and do so in a manner that
ensures compliance with the principles just mentioned as well as fidelity to
the law itself on the part of officials.
It is in this manner that limits on state powers to gather evidence and
detain subjects by notions of probable cause, reasonableness, and warrant
requirement can be seen as critical to the realization of rule of law norms.
The same can be said of the right to exclude illegally obtained evidence, to
challenge illegal arrests, to a fair trial with effective counsel and meaningful
confrontation of witnesses, to meaningful appeal, and to punishment as
provided by law. All of these very practical procedural protections are
essential to ensuring the state's adherence to the rule of law's normative
agenda.' 8' Needless to say, although many of these rights are expressed in
long-standing constitutional and common law principles, on the whole, they
became meaningful only recently in American criminal law and procedure,
and only by a fortuitous combination of structural conditions and political
and judicial activism."8 2
Just as American criminal justice approached compliance with the rule of
law in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it began a steady retreat from this
position. Long predating the "war on terrorism," this trend involves a whole
series of developments in law and policy. Well-described by others, 183 the
main feature of this trend need only be mentioned briefly to capture its
essence. The relentless attrition of rights regarding search and seizure and
arrest, 184 effective representation by counsel, 185 and appeal 86 has expanded
181. For a further elaboration of the connection between rule of law norms and practical
civil liberties and procedural protections, see generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF
LEGALITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1996).
182. See generally JEANNE THEOHARIS & ATHAN THEOHARIS, THESE YET TO BE UNITED
STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICA SINCE 1945 (2003).
183. For an overview of the erosion of civil liberties and the relationship of these
developments to rule of law norms, see generally ALLEN, supra note 181; DAVID COLE, No
EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999)
[hereinafter COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE]; JOHN F. DECKER, REVOLUTION TO THE RIGHT: CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE DURING THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT ERA (1992); SAMUEL
WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 1950-1990
(1993); David J. Bodenhamer, Reversing the Revolution. Rights of the Accused in a
Conservative Age, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA: AFTER 200 YEARS 101 (David
J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1993); Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the
Rehnquist Court: Has the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 IND. L.J. 273 (1986-87).
184. See generally David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered, 87 GEO. L.J.
1059 (1999); Illya Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement, 50 CLEV. ST. L.
[Ariz. St. L.J.810
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considerably the acceptable boundaries of discretionary, unequal, and
legally unauthorized assertions of state power. From its promising
expansion in earlier decades, equal protection doctrine has become almost
irrelevant in the face of racial profiling and overwhelming racial inequalities
in punishment.'87 And the expansion of "harmless error" doctrine has muted
the formal authority of the law over official decisions. 88
REV. 425 (2002-2003); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 1257 (1989-90); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984).
185. The main problem in this area over the last several decades has been the failure of
funding and services to keep up with the increased caseloads or resources available to
prosecutors and police. See Rebecca Marcus, Comment, Racism in Our Courts: The
Underfunding of Public Defenders and Its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 228, 233 (1994); see also Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has
No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel,
13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 656-81 (1986); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 6-12 (1998); Douglas W.
Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death
Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 356-74 (1995). Other impediments include increased court
fees and costs, and even the effects on litigation of sentencing reform. Peter Erlinder, Muting
Gideon's Trumpet: Pricing the "Right to Counsel" in Minnesota Courts, 60-DEC BENCH & B.
MINN. 16 (2003); Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal
Criminal Courts, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 427, 443-80 (2004).
186. The erosion of rights of appeal is especially evident in the habeas corpus context.
These changes are reflected in a number of cases and statutes, including for example the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, & 42 U.S.C.); O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (affirming exhaustion requirement); Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (endorsing waiver doctrine); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(barring exclusionary rule claims). On these reforms, the effects of which are most salient in the
death penalty context, see generally Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional
Critique and Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1 (2002); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699 (2002).
187. Equal protection claims against racial profiling require evidence of intent and feature
no exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights, 37 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1107, 1109-10 (2000); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51
VAND. L. REV. 333, 342-62 (1998); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13
(1996) (rejecting subjective analysis of police officers' intent in search and seizure cases for
Fourth Amendment purposes). On discrimination in sentencing policy, see generally David A.
Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995). On the problem
of race and equal protection in the criminal justice context, see generally Andrew D. Leipold,
Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal
Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559 (1998).
188. On the origins of the harmless error doctrine, which were initially legislative, and its
gradual expansion over the last several decades, see Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But
Not Always Harmless, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1173-83 (1995); see also Jeffrey 0. Cooper,
Searchingfor Harmlessness, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 313-17 (2002).
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These changes in doctrine are accompanied by equally significant
changes in policy. The criminal justice system has expanded about five-fold
in overall size in the last thirty years, incarcerating and exercising
supervision over a massively expanded segment of the population. 89 This
increase reflects above all the fact that, compared to thirty years ago, the
criminal law is significantly more punitive, applying much lengthier, more
onerous punishments.190 There has also been significant expansion in the
use of "intermediate" punishments like parole and probation. 9' Such
increases in the scale of the criminal justice response reflect an absolute
expansion in sovereignty that, as we shall see later, imposes serious
practical limits on the state's capacity to adhere to rule of law norms.
Other changes in sentencing policy have not only reaffirmed, but
dramatically expanded the discretion and overall power of prosecutors. 92
189. The number of people subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system at every
level-whether as suspects, defendants, or offenders-has increased about five fold in less than
thirty years. At last count, American prisons and jails held over two million people on any given
day. PAIGE M. HARRISON & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 198877, PRISON
AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2002, 1, 7 (2003); JAMES J. STEPHAN & JENNIFER C. KARBERG,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 198272, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES, 2000, at 3 (2003). Moreover, the current rate of imprisonment is at least three times
greater than the rate at any point prior to 1970. HENRY RUTH & KEVIN R. REITZ, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME 18-22 (2003). This incredible increase has generated equally large
increases in the prevalence of the prison experience, both past and projected. At current rates,
6.6 percent of all Americans and about one-third of black Americans males may expect to serve
time in prison in their lives. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 197976,
PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, 1 (2003). The expansion
of the criminal justice system can also be seen financially. Over the last twenty years or so,
"justice expenditures" have increased from 1.10 percent of gross domestic product to 1.66
percent; adjusted for inflation this represents a mean per-capita increase in annual expenditures
on criminal justice from $158 in 1982 to $320 in 2001. LYNN BAUER & STEVEN D. OWENS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 202792, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2001, at 3, 8 (2004).
190. Increases in incarceration rates over the last several decades have not been
proportional to increases in crime. To broach a different issue, neither have such increases
clearly reduced the incidence of crime. For a critical review of the literature on this topic, see,
for example, RUTH & RErrZ, supra note 189, at 92-102.
191. See LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 201135, PROBATION AND PAROLE
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002, at 1 (2003); DIANA R. GORDON, THE JUSTICE JUGGERNAUT 92-147
(1990).
192. See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 503-12 (1992); William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino,
Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 373,
382-95 (1995). Recent congressional legislation, the Feeley Amendment in particular, further
limits judicial authority in sentencing. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76;
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Explicitly retroactive sanctions have come to proliferate.1 93 At the same
time, expanded notions of criminality have caused the criminal justice
system to regulate an increasingly broad range of behaviors. 194 On the
administrative side, private involvement in criminal justice processes in the
form of private corrections and policing and victims' rights, has reemerged
as a means of placing sovereignty beyond the purview of rule of law
norms. 195  Policing, prosecution, and corrections have all become
increasingly aggressive and contemptuous of legal restraints, as reflected in
widespread lawlessness on the part of each of these institutions.1 96 These
see also David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 218-24
(2004).
193. A retroactive effect is evident in a number of very popular programs in contemporary
criminal justice: sex offender registration laws, civil commitment regimes, and habitual offender
laws. These regimes impose onerous (if not strictly "punitive") and often indefinite sanctions on
the basis of past acts, even where those acts were committed prior to the enactment of the new
regime. But the courts have found ways to insulate each from constitutional challenge on this
ground. In upholding sexual offender registration measures, the courts have generally taken one
of two approaches. One approach is that such laws do not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause
because they do not entail punishment. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97-99 (2003);
Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The other approach is to reason
that such measures actually criminalize failure to comply with the relevant regime and in this
sense are prospective, not retroactive. See, e.g., State v. Armbrust, 59 P.3d 1000, 1003 (Kan.
2002). The courts have generally saved civil commitment laws from Ex Post Facto analysis by
deeming them non-criminal. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369-71 (1997);
Peterson v. State, 36 P.3d 1053, 1055-57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). With habitual offender laws,
the argument has usually been to construe the relevant conduct as the offence for which
punishment is enhanced, which negates the problem of retroactivity. See, e.g., Gryger v. Burke,
334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (declaring such a sentence to be "a stiffened penalty for the latest
crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offence because a repetitive one"); United States
v. Tucker, 982 F. Supp. 1309, 1312-13, (N.D. Ill. 1997) (extending this principle to sentencing
guidelines and describing the trend among circuit courts). A similar development is evident in
retroactive changes to statutes of limitations, an agenda particularly relevant to sex crimes; but
here too the problem has been avoided by the courts. See, e.g., R. Brian Tanner, Comment, A
Legislative Miracle: Revival Prosecutions and the Ex Post Facto Clauses, 50 EMORY L.J. 397,
410-22 (2001). A recent Supreme Court ruling has held this practice to be unconstitutional
under the applicable Ex Post Facto Clause, at least where the original statute of limitations had
expired by the time the revival statute was enacted. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003).
194. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 512-23 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law].
195. On the rise of private prisons and their antithetical relationship to rule of law norms,
see Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in
Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111 (2001). On private policing, see David
A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1193-1229 (1999). On victims' rights
and their juridical implications, see Ahmed A. White, Victims' Rights, Rule of Law, and the
Threat to Liberal Jurisprudence, 87 KY. L.J. 357 (1999).
196. On this tendency among police, see, for example, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-98- 111, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: LAW ENFORCEMENT: INFORMATION ON DRUG-RELATED POLICE CORRUPTION
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developments made it appropriate, even before the current hysteria about
terrorism, to wonder whether rule of law norms would survive at all in the
criminal justice context.
This transformation of the criminal justice system accords with a deeper
shift in culture and ideology. As David Garland shows, the criminal justice
system as it had come to exist in the early 1970s was characterized by a
number of relatively soft, welfarist features: a tendency to view crime as an
episodic social pathology susceptible to reduction through social reform; a
view of "the criminal" as a redeemable member of society susceptible to
individual rehabilitation; a skeptical posture towards retributivist,
incapacitating, or symbolic modes of punishment and an accompanying bias
against overly harsh sentences; and an overarching faith in professionalism
and progress.'97 Within a very short time--certainly at some point between
the mid 1970s and mid 1980s-this was almost completely replaced by a
new and radically different orthodoxy, defined by very different
commitments: a tendency to see criminality as insusceptible to
rehabilitation, if not genetically (or racially) coded; a return to retribution
and incapacitation as goals of punishment; a skepticism towards
professional norms as impediments to the fight against crime; and a
rejection of a progressive orientation in favor of an explicitly pessimistic
and reactionary attitude towards the prospects of achieving a crime-free
society. 198
D. The Shift in the Dominant Mode of Social Control and its Causes
Critical to understanding the nature of this transformation of the criminal
justice system is its relationship to the welfare state. The latter's
retrenchment and the former's explosive growth reflect different sides of a
single process, what social scientists Katherine Beckett and Bruce Western
(1998) Human Rights Watch, Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the
United States (1998), http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/index.htm (last visited Oct. 21,
2005). On lawlessness among prosecutors, see, for example, JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A
BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 (2000),
http://www2.law.columbia.edulinstructionalservices/liebman (identifying prosecutors' failure to
convey exculpatory evidence to defendants as the second most frequent type of reversible error
in capital cases) (last visited Oct. 21, 2005). On lawlessness among prison officials, where it
often takes the form of inmate-on-inmate and official-on-inmate rape, see, for example, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS (2001)
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2005); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, ALL TOO FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S.
STATE PRISONS (1996).
197. GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL, supra note 145, at 1-2.
198. Id.; cf BECKETr, supra note 86, at 79-88.
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call "a larger shift in the governance of social marginality."' 99 As the
welfare state has withdrawn from its role in governing the lower classes, the
criminal justice system has expanded its functions in this realm, in the
process coming into increasing conflict with rule of law norms. It is by this
process that the demise of the welfare state has undermined the rule of law.
This section describes the nature of this process as well as its causes. A
critical theme in this discussion is that the very factors that account for this
shift in the governance of marginality-the consolidation of neo-liberalism
and the onset of chronic fiscal crisis-have heightened the state's social
control response, exacerbating the criminal justice system's conflict with
the rule of law.2 °°
1. The Social Control of Marginality in the Age of Social Welfare
Retrenchment
As even the most casual student of welfare policy knows, the end of
welfare has hardly ended the kind of social marginality to which welfare
had been so responsive. Indeed, the retreat of the welfare state has
combined with neo-liberal policies to generate what racial sociologist Loic
Wacquant calls a condition of "advanced marginality" characterized by the
de-proletarianization of broad sections of the lower classes and the
consignment of others to increasingly casual, unrewarding work, the
experience of increasingly permanent, spatially concentrated poverty, the
collapse of informal supports, and heightened political and social
stigmatization of poverty.2 °1 In this context the threat of disorder looms
199. Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: Welfare,
Incarceration, and the Transformation of State Policy, 3 PUNISHMENT & SoC'Y 43, 44 (2001).
200. It is important to recognize at the outset the importance of more specific forces in this
shift in social control: electoral and institutional politics, business' profit-driven manipulation of
anxieties about crime, actual increases in crime rates, and even a shift in the tenor of political
rhetoric and scholarly debates about crime. This Article does not deny the influence of these
essentially political and cultural factors; rather, it situates them within an overarching set of
structural changes which have prefigured the course of these changes. For a review of the
complex political and cultural forces at work in social welfare retrenchment, see generally
O'CONNOR, A POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 155. For a review of the equally complicated
forces that have shaped the expansion and transformation of the criminal justice system, see
generally BECKETr, supra note 86; GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL, supra note 145;
David J. Rothman, More of the Same: American Criminal Justice Policies in the 1990s, in
PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL 29 (Thomas G. Blomberg & Stanley Cohen eds., 1995);
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 194.
201. See generally Loic J. D. Wacquant, The Rise of Advanced Marginality: Notes on its
Nature and Implications, 39 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 121 (1996) [hereinafter Wacquant, The Rise of
Advanced Marginality]; Loic Wacquant, Urban Marginality in the Coming Millennium, 36 URB.
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constantly, augmented by accelerating inequalities in income, wealth, and
power. Social control remains an essential function for the state if it is to
prevent these conditions from degenerating into an explosion of criminality,
riots, and other expressions of disorder, and the further deterioration of
respect for establishment norms regarding property, authority, and work.
According to scholars like Wacquant, Beckett, and Western, the criminal
justice system's metastatic development over the last several decades
reflects its gradual inheritance from the welfare system of a lead obligation
in addressing this problem.0 2 A brief review underscores the kind of
process they have in mind.
Against the otherwise ungoverned threat of disorder, for example, there
are several times more police and correctional officers per capita today than
there were thirty years ago. Notably, these officers are organized in reactive,
increasingly militaristic ways. 203 They are better armed. 2° "S.W.A.T" teams
are ubiquitous, as is the overall militarization of law enforcement-in
organization, training, weaponry, and the like. Novelties once found mainly
among large and wealthy police departments, things like computer
coordinated command systems, mobile command posts, sniper teams, and
"airborne" units, have become ubiquitous "crime fighting" devices. 2 5 And
of course, law enforcement has embraced more aggressive policing
strategies, including quality of life, public order, and "zero-tolerance"
concepts, with their overt investment in the maintenance of class boundaries
in social space.2 °6 All of this reflects an expanded commitment by police not
only to a class-laden project of controlling crime-which, as many critics
point out, cannot explain the inflationary growth of any part of the criminal
justice system-but also to maintaining class boundaries in public space,
containing militant protests, and generally affirming the sanctity of order,
hierarchy, and property.
STUD. 1639, 1643 (1999); Douglas S. Massey, The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affluence
and Poverty in the Twenty-First Century, 33 DEMOGRAPHY 395 (1996).
202. Beckett & Western, supra note 199, at 44-47.
203. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE
USE OF FORCE 89-171 (1993).
204. Jacqueline M. Graves, How Cops Will Rearm, Tom Clancy Style, FORTUNE, July 11,
1994, at 16.
205. On the development of this apparatus, see, for example, PARENTI, supra note 132, at
111-38.
206. For an overview of various features of this model of policing in practice, see generally
HARD Cop, SOFT Cop: DILEMMAS AND DEBATES IN CONTEMPORARY POLICING (Roger Hopkins
Burke ed., 2004). See also PARENTI, supra note 132, at 90-110; Fyfe, supra note 140, at 764-
65. See generally Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminalization,
14 YALE L. &POL'YREV. 1 (1996).
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This new emphasis on social control extends to a renewal of the criminal
justice system's labor-disciplining function, as this too has been abandoned
by the shrunken welfare state. Instead of relatively soft incentives to
embrace the virtues of work, these "rejects of market society" 207 are
presented with three choices: either accept whatever work opportunities (or
increasingly paltry and temporary welfare benefits) are available; sink into a
level of destitution from which the state might not save them; or resort to
criminal means of support and risk increasingly severe punishment. It is the
last of these options, of course, that contemporary criminal justice policy is
increasingly aimed at foreclosing. Expressed in terms of the principle of
lesser eligibility, the current regime presents the lower classes with ever
more onerous consequences of nonparticipation in the labor market to
match both the deterioration of labor standards and the retreat of social
welfare. The rhetoric of morality and public safety aside, such is the real
logic of "truth in sentencing," "three strikes" laws, and other policies
designed to intensify punishment.
In similar fashion, the criminal justice system has also come to play a
greater role in asserting physical and spatial control over the unemployed,
the underemployed, and the down and out in a post-welfare world. One
does not have to accept rigidly Rusche and Kirchheimer's labor control
thesis (which, it will be recalled, is premised on a lock-step and cyclical
relationship between labor supply and incarceration) to appreciate, in the
nature of contemporary incarceration, the truth of their broader claim-that
incarceration has evolved as a means of containing the most redundant and
useless components of the capitalist labor force. Such is the view taken by
Raymond Michalowski and Susan Carlson, who attempt to cast the
relationship between labor surplus and incarceration in "historically
contingent" terms, as having evolved along with changes in economic
structure, the emergence of a permanent "underclass," and the demise of the
social welfare system. From such a perspective, the dramatic increases
evident in incarceration levels over the past three decades are but the
reflection of a policy of criminalizing and warehousing the "rejects of
market society"-in lieu of their becoming officially unemployed.2"8
Consistent with this view, Beckett and Western also argue on empirical
207. Loic Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3
PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 95, 98 (2001) [hereinafter Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis].
208. See generally Raymond J. Michalowski & Susan M. Carlson, Unemployment,
Imprisonment, and Social Structures of Accumulation: Historical Contingency in the Rusche-
Kirchheimer Hypothesis, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 217 (1999). Michalowski and Carlson see the
relationship between unemployment rates and incarceration over their most recent period of
analysis, 1980-1992, as distorted in large part by the emergence of an underclass that no longer
actively participated in the job market. Id.
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grounds that prison is now the lead institution for the regulation of
unemployed labor in contemporary America. 20 9 The logic of this is more
than just warehousing, though. Most incarcerated people have indeed
committed crimes, but the kinds of crime for which they are incarcerated
highlight even more clearly the social control dynamics at work. The vast
majority of inmates are being held for drug, property, and public order
offenses-crimes that, at root, involve breaches of the boundaries of
acceptable labor activity. Equally consistent with the present thesis is the
fact that these crimes account for the majority of the growth in incarceration
over the last several decades. 1 °
Neither are these the only indications of a stepped-up effort to control
labor through criminal justice functions. Despite the spectacular increase in
the scale of incarceration and the transformation of the prison that has
accompanied this growth, Ignatieff's vision of the prison remains relevant
today. Prisons adhere to a general labor disciplining function of stressing
actual workforce training as the key rehabilitative goal, and, in some cases,
undertaking the commercial exploitation of prison labor.2  Such an
emphasis on labor market participation is also imposed on many of the four
million or so offenders on probation, parole, or other forms of intermediate
209. Bruce Western & Katherine Beckett, How Unregulated is the U.S. Labor Market? The
Penal System as a Labor Market Institution, 104 AM. J. Soc. 1030, 1040-44 (1999).
210. On these dynamics, see RUTH & REITZ, supra note 189, passim.
211. Contemporary prisons are overwhelmingly committed to regimentation and other
structured hierarchies. As at the origin of prisons, most contemporary inmates today lead lives
that are strictly controlled for most of the day, every day. Just as entrenched are various regimes
for prison labor. Nowadays, this tends to consist of labor for the benefit of the state, easily
coerced from bored inmates by making labor a condition of privileges and other benefits of
confinement. In a rebuke, of sorts, to the principle of lesser eligibility, most inmates prefer work
to idle boredom in any case. In recent periods of supposed labor shortage, the idea of expanding
prison labor back into the private, for-profit sector has resurfaced, to be championed by
academics and government officials alike. Here, the contemporary rhetoric is especially telling.
Even many liberal commentators embrace the idea, arguing along with more conservative
authorities, that market-style labor will better enhance inmates' "employability" and
"marketable skills" while investing them with the values and ethics considered necessary to
rejoin the ranks of the working class. See, e.g., Editorial, Inmates in the Labor Pool, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, March 27, 2000, at 8. Prison officials and corrections experts speak repeatedly of
the benefits that prison labor affords in the form of "enhance[d] discipline," as well as "job
training and rehabilitation" and improved "inmate financial responsibility." FEDERAL BUREAU
OF PRISONS, FACTORIES WITH FENCES: THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES 10-11
(1996). For very explicit expressions of this view, see, for example, Lynn McAuley, Work with
a Purpose: The Role of Work Force Development in the New Millennium, CORRECTIONS
TODAY, Oct. 1999, at 8; Jeremy Travis, Prisons, Work and Re-Entry, CORRECTIONS TODAY,
Oct. 1999, at 102-03. see also Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners' Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV.
339, 374-98 (1998).
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sanction, who are often required to search for work (and in some cases, to
hold down jobs) as a condition of avoiding imprisonment." 2
Even the most casual perspective on this process notices its coincidence
with the control of racial minorities-blacks in particular. As indicated
earlier, this reflects both the independent and enduring significance of race
as an axis of social control and the convergence of race with class in
defining the kinds of marginality over which the criminal justice system
governs.213 Concentrations of blacks and lower class populations pose
potentially distinct but usually convergent threats to social order-threats
that generate increased arrests, greater police violence, escalated
imprisonment, and an overall expansion in the scale of the criminal justice
system.21 4 In the demographic convergence of race and class too, as
Wacquant points out, are heightened occasions for social control: greater
concentrations of poverty; greater unemployment and underemployment
rates; more frequent riots; higher rates of conventional criminality; and a
mutually reinforcing stigma.21 5 Race aggravates both marginality and its
effects, thereby enhancing the sense of threat and the felt need to reject the
welfare state for ever more coercive and punitive forms of control.
2. Explaining the Changing Dynamics of Social Control: Neo-
Liberalism, the Transformation of Capitalism, and the Fiscal
Crisis of the State
Not least among the factors motivating this shift in the social control of
the lower classes is the increasingly hegemonic reign of neo-liberalism over
American politics of the past several decades. As both policy and ideology,
212. See GORDON, supra note 191, at 116-18, 129-30.
213. On the convergence of race and class in the operation of the criminal justice system,
see generally TONRY, supra note 100; JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-
AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996).
214. Empirical support for these contentions is fairly extensive and the overall "threat"
literature fairly well developed. This approach has its origins both in the work of Rusche and
Kirchheimer and (especially in its racial dimensions) in the scholarship of HUBERT M.
BLALOCK, JR., TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS (Capricorn Books 1970)
(1967). See generally David Jacobs & Ronald E. Helms, Testing Coercive Explanations for
Order: The Determinants of Law Enforcement Strength over Time, 75 SOC. FORCES 1361 (1997)
(describing a relationship between economic inequality and police force size); David Jacobs &
Ronald Helms, Collective Outbursts, Politics, and Punitive Resources: Toward a Political
Sociology of Spending on Social Control, 77 SOC. FORCES 1497 (1999) (on the relationship
between "mass racial threats" and corrections spending); Martha A. Myers, Black Threat and
Incarceration in Postbellum Georgia, 69 SOC. FORCES 373 (1990) (on the relationship between
black/lower class threat and incarceration).
215. Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis, supra note 207, at 95-127. See generally Wacquant,
The Rise of Advanced Marginality, supra note 201.
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this new regime is actually a contradictory blend of neo-conservative
features with genuinely neo-liberal themes. For on the one hand (in its neo-
liberalism), this regime is characterized by its active support for "free
market" capitalism, including de-regulation, privatization, and a rejection of
Keynesian economic policies; on the other hand (in its neo-conservatism),
this regime also promotes social norms of a decidedly authoritarian, illiberal
character, especially with regard to the lower classes. 216
Neo-liberalism is fundamentally hostile to the social welfare system and
has taken an active role in attacks on its intellectual and political credibility.
It casts the social welfare system as inherently inconsistent with both neo-
liberal economic policies and neo-conservative social values, as irrelevant
to the middle and upper classes, as an inevitable drain on social income and
wealth, and as a fetter on labor market participation on the part of the lower
classes. 217 By the same token, neo-liberalism-still speaking of the entire,
contradictory edifice-features an equally inherent affinity for the
expansion of the criminal justice system. From the standpoint of its
economic agenda, the merits of order and labor discipline overcome any
costs in artificial labor shortages and the "disqualification" of labor that
inhere in the embrace of social control by criminal justice. From the
standpoint of its social agenda, the payoff of an expanded criminal justice
system is the legitimation of social inequality in moral and retributivist
terms. It is in this vein that political critiques of the social welfare system
over the last several decades have so consistently imputed to that system not
just a failure adequately to control the lower classes, but more dubiously, a
role in creating criminality.1 8
As suggested above, the hegemony of neo-liberal policies informs this
shift in social control in other ways as well. For by its labor and social
policies as well as its attack on the welfare state, neo-liberalism has
accelerated the material and cultural degradation of the lower classes. De-
industrialization, the destruction of low-skill manufacturing jobs, and the
near annihilation of the labor movement, which all have some basis in the
continuation of the state's aggressive embrace of capitalist interests,2 19 have
set the stage for concentrated, permanent poverty, the proliferation of the
216. GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL, supra note 145, at 98-102; see also Loic
Wacquant, The Penalisation of Poverty and the Rise of Neo-Liberalism, 9 EUR. J. ON CRIM.
POL'Y & RES. 401, 404 (2001) [hereinafter Wacquant, The Penalisation of Poverty]. On the
characteristics of neo-liberalism as political economy, see POLLIN, supra note 171, at 3-20.
217. GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL, supra note 145, at 154-58.
218. On this perspective, see BECKETr, supra note 86, at 28-29, 34-36, 49-52.
219. On the long germination of urban crisis and social marginality, see generally THOMAS
J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT
(1996).
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drug trade, the expansion of "predatory" street gangs, the elimination of
viable work, urban riots, persistently high rates of property crime, and other
expressions of an emergent "underclass., 220 In short, neo-liberalism is both
the ideological and the policy basis for the development of Wacquant's
advanced marginality; it is the mechanism that "qualifies" the poor for
arrest, imprisonment, and other expressions of this new means of governing
marginality.
12 1
This new dynamic of marginality accompanies the advent of generalized
crisis in American capitalism. The period from the end of the Second World
War through the early 1970s was one of unprecedented prosperity,
characterized by tremendous growth in gross domestic product, income,
productivity, profits, and overall standards of living, by economic stability,
and by extraordinary American ascendance in the world economy.2 22 Since
then, however, rates of growth in gross domestic product, income,
productivity, and profits have all fallen off; American dominance in
manufacturing and international trade has receded dramatically; deep
recessions have returned to the fore; and the economic system has become
less governed and, apparently, less governable 3.22  Even the alleged
prosperity of the mid and late 1990s dissolves under a critical eye as more
of a boon for the already-affluent than the dawn of a new era of widespread
prosperity.2 24 These deteriorating structural conditions have not only spurred
increasing social marginality; they have immersed all of society in
uncertainty and insecurity.
These key features of the age of neo-liberalism, marginality and
generalized crisis, have contributed in several ways to the shift in the
dynamics of social control. For, as Garland points out, the tendency of
generalized social crisis to heighten the sense of threat and insecurity
among the upper classes inevitably encourages hard, criminal justice
220. On the role of economic policy changes of the last several decades in creating an
concentrated urban poverty, see JARGOWSKY, supra note 173, at 145-213; see also WILSON,
supra note 131.
221. See generally Wacquant, The Rise of Advanced Marginality, supra note 201.
222. See generally Andrew Glyn et al., The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age, in THE
GOLDEN AGE OF CAPITALISM: REINTERPRETING THE POSTWAR EXPERIENCE 39 (Stephen A.
Marglin & Juliet B. Schor eds., 1990).
223. On the overall decline of the American economy since the early 1970s, see generally
ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991, at 403-18
(Vintage Books 1996) (1994); PHILIP ARMSTRONG ET AL., CAPITALISM SiNCE 1945 (Basil
Blackwell 1991) (1984). The theme of disorganization and crisis is actually explored by a
number of scholars. See generally ScoTT LASH & JOHN URRY, THE END OF ORGANIZED
CAPITALISM (Univ. of Wis. Press 1987); CLAUS OFFE, DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM:
CONTEMPORARY TRANSFORMATIONS OF WORK AND POLITICS (1985).
224. See POLLIN, supra note 171, passim (see especially app. 1).
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responses to the problems of social control. 25 Furthermore, in the face of
these dynamics, the social welfare system appears as a woefully inadequate
model of social control (notwithstanding limitations on its capacity for
social control occasioned by this very neo-liberal agenda). 226 In addition to
this it seems that the only viable way to assert control over the lower classes
is via the overtly punitive model of social control that the criminal justice
system provides. By this logic, "nothing works"--or rather, seems to
work-except reactionary, get-tough policies. The criminal justice system
must be expanded and the power of the state in this domain intensified; and
the social welfare system must be drawn back and made more punitive in its
own right . 27 At the same time marginality and crisis provide a structural
basis for the ideological critique of the welfare state; for it is on the social
welfare system that poverty as well as economic volatility and stagnation
are blamed.228
The rise of neo-liberalism and its institutional adjuncts goes a long way
towards explaining the shift in the dominant mode of social control. But to
focus on this alone leaves out a critical element in this process, a thirty-year
period of fiscal crisis that has further influenced these developments.
Undoubtedly, sustained fiscal realities limit the state's ability to rely on
criminal justice as a mode of social control. 229 However, this is only part of
the story. Fiscal crisis has imposed even greater limits on the social welfare
system and its utility as a means of social control, and in this way
influenced its displacement as a dominant means of social control.
An understanding of this process owes much to James O'Connor's
classic work on the political economy of the social welfare system.
According to O'Connor, fiscal crisis is inherent in the welfare state. This
follows from the interaction of several dynamics. O'Connor takes the view,
consistent with the idea of the welfare state as a mechanism of social
control, that its institutions are fundamentally oriented to the socialization
and politicization of the costs of capitalism. 2 30 The problem is that while the
225. GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL, supra note 145, at 175-90, 196-97.
226. This accords with a tendency, described by Piven and Cloward, for the upper classes
to see the lower classes as uniquely responsive to punitive policies of control. PIVEN &
CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR, supra note 162, at 38-39.
227. See generally GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL, supra note 145.
228. See Offe, Democracy Against the Welfare State, supra note 66, at 528.
229. GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL, supra note 145, at 191-92.
230. For O'Connor, such costs entail "social capital" (consisting of both "social expenses"
and "social investments"), which provides incentives and direct support for the "reproduction of
labor," private capital accumulation, and "social expenses," which consist of both traditional
welfare and "warfare" functions, and which are oriented to the consumption and support of
excess capital and labor. O'CONNOR, THE FIscAL CRIsIs, supra note 68, at 101-17, 159-69. On
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welfare state socializes these costs, it is unable to socialize the profits of
capitalism in sufficient amounts to cover the bill. On one level, this follows
from the inability of the capitalist state to challenge the basic hegemony that
capital exercises over the political system.13' On another level, it also shows
the inherent limits of welfarist reform. For even to tax capital sufficiently to
pay the costs of the welfare state is politically untenable-as would be the
alternative, to resort to inflationary monetary policies.232 Either course
would also defeat the central purpose of the welfare state within the
political economy of capitalism, which is to sustain profitability in the face
of capitalism's tendencies toward social crisis. This would also tend to
undermine the legitimacy of the state itself.
2 13
According to O'Connor, this intractable problem is exacerbated by
several factors: the steady expansion of military expenditures (the "warfare
state"); the tendency of demands on the welfare state to expand along with
rising standards of living; and most of all, the growth of the welfare state in
response to increasing agitation by the lower classes and the efforts of
capitalists (especially monopoly capitalists) to displace labor costs as well
as the costs of maintaining social order onto the state. 234 In addition to these
factors, we might add a more uniquely contemporary one: a kind of tax
competition that has taken hold both domestically and internationally by
which businesses leverage lower tax rates in exchange for investment
towards "economic development.,
235
For O'Connor, the result of these dynamics is a condition of chronic
fiscal crisis, a prediction borne out by the recent history of government
finance.236 This inevitably compromises both the fiscal viability of welfare
O'Connor's framework, see, for example, Fred Block, The Fiscal Crisis of the Capitalist State,
7 ANN. REV. SOC. 1 (1981); see also OFFE, Crisis of Crisis Management, supra note 77, at 57.
231. O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS, supra note 68, at 40. A very similar point is made by
Offe. OFFE, Crisis of Crisis Management, supra note 77, at 49-50.
232. O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS, supra note 68, at 203-15.
233. Id. at 40. Offe makes the same point: "The state protects the capital relation from the
social conditions it produces without being able to alter the status of this relationship as the
dominant relationship." OFFE, Crisis of Crisis Management, supra note 77, at 49-50.
234. O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS, supra note 68, at 9-10, 64-70, 159-61. O'Connor also
mentions in this connection the end of subsistence production, a process still very much
underway thirty years ago, when his work appeared.
235. On the international parameters of this issue, see generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1573 (2000); Rachel Weber, Why Local Economic Development Incentives Don't Create Jobs:
The Role of Corporate Governance, 32 URB. LAW. 97 (2000); Donald L. Bartlett & James B.
Steele, Paying a Price for Polluters: Many of America's Largest Companies Foul the
Environment but Clean up on Billions of Dollars in Tax Benefits, TIME, Nov. 23, 1998, at 72.
236. On the contemporary parameters of fiscal crisis, see POLLIN, supra note 171, at 68-75,
94-104 (analyzing fiscal problems under the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations).
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programs and the political legitimacy of the social welfare system. Fiscal
crisis results directly in the elimination of some social welfare programs and
in a reduction in the functionality of remaining programs.237 By both of
these means, fiscal crisis gives apparent credence to ideological critiques of
the concept of welfare as unworkable and to tax revolts and other acts of
middle and upper class rebellion that underlie the dynamics of fiscal crisis
in the first place. 238 Amidst these tendencies, the social welfare system itself
inevitably loses legitimacy as a mode of social control.
23 9
At the same time that the fiscal crisis erodes the legitimacy of the social
welfare system and renders it increasingly untenable, it increases the
relative legitimacy of the criminal justice system. This occurs in several
ways. First, as we have already seen, social crises generally generate a bias
in favor of hard forms of social control of the lower classes. This bias
proves self-sustaining in the context of fiscal crisis, in that the essential
wisdom of hard control seems to be confirmed by the escalating social
dysfunctions-and the growing dysfunctions of welfare state institutions
themselves-that attend the social welfare system's loss of political favor
and functionality. This is not helped by the fact that in recent years fiscal
crisis has been exacerbated by changes in tax policy that simultaneously
aggravate social inequality.24 Thus the retrenchment of the social welfare
system and its consequences become part of the dynamic over which the
See generally THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATES (Steven D. Gold ed., 1995); MAX B. SAWICKY,
EcON. POLICY INST., THE ROOTS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR FISCAL CRISIS (1991).
237. The effects of fiscal crisis on the viability of the welfare state are particularly salient at
the state and municipal level, where governments have been called on in recent decades to
assume a larger share of the burden in providing services, but face more explicit political and
legal hurdles (often in the form of prohibitions on deficit spending) than does the federal
government. This is compounded by the fact that fiscal crisis has often led to layoffs by these
very governments, which then increase the demand for welfare programs. See SHARON PARROTT
& NINA WU, CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES ARE CUTTING TANF AND CHILD
CARE PROGRAMS 1 (2003); see also KATZ, supra note 91, at 290-92. One feature of recent
welfare reform is that, as states have been given greater authority in the implementation of
social welfare programs, they have also adopted budget restraints that prevent deficit spending,
compounding the policy implications of fiscal crisis. See, e.g., John Kincaid, The Crisis in
Fiscal Federalism, 76 SPECTRUM: J. OF ST. GOv'T 5 (2003).
238. Particularly destructive in this regard was the (dubious) claim that the fiscal drain of
the social welfare state was itself responsible for economic stagnation in the post-Vietnam era.
Anwar Shaikh, Who Pays for the "Welfare" in the Welfare State? A Multicountry Study, 70
SOC. RES. 531, 534-36 (2003).
239. The irony in this process for the welfare state is that the demise of the welfare state has
less to do with the welfare state itself than with the concentration within it of capitalism's
dysfunctions. See OFFE, Contradictions of the Welfare State, supra note 86, at 153.
240. POLLIN, supra note 171, at 94-108.
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criminal justice system is called on to assert its agenda of social control-
despite its own escalating costs.241
Second, we have also seen how both models of social control are
invested in the principle of lesser eligibility. But the criminal justice system
is much more able to exploit the logic of this principle-or at least, it seems
more able to do so-under conditions of poverty and marginality than is the
welfare state. For by its nature, it presents a harsher, more direct, and by the
crudely malevolent logic of contemporary social control, more efficient
means of attaining compliance with the social order. This apparent
advantage as a form of social control is enhanced by fiscal crisis. As the
social welfare system retreats, as this retreat reduces the condition of the
lower classes, and as social welfare seems less relevant to the issue of how
to control the lower classes, the ability of the criminal justice system to
exploit its advantage in lesser eligibility seems ever greater and more
relevant.
A third reason concerns the fact that fiscal crisis is ultimately expressed
as a question of political legitimacy. We may recall that welfarist responses
to social control, whether within the criminal justice system or the social
welfare system proper, aspire to some level of inclusiveness and humanity.
In a society defined by class conflict and inequality, this project is
enormously ambitious, requiring layers of treatment, rehabilitation, and
social support, whether within the criminal justice system or via the
institutions of social welfare. If they are to be successful, these undertakings
are by their nature expensive, requiring the mobilization of vast, often
redundant bureaucracies. In comparison, the criminal justice system (purged
of its welfarist tendencies) is an inherently cheaper proposition. Despite
ubiquitous attempts of critics to compare its costs unfavorably to those of
the social welfare system-prison beds versus college education being the
chief point of comparison-the criminal justice system enjoys several
inherent advantages in the intersection of fiscal realities and political
legitimacy which go beyond simple balance sheet comparisons. For one
thing, it does nothing to challenge the distribution of wealth and income.
For another, recast in reactionary terms, the criminal justice system's
performance standards are much more easily obtainable, entailing little
more than exclusion of the criminal from society. Indeed, to a degree the
contemporary criminal justice system does not even pretend to succeed at
reducing crime much less reforming criminals. Its success lies, ironically, in
241. In Wacquant' s words, the shift to a criminal justice model of social control can be seen
as "designed to manage the effects of neo-liberal policies at the lower end of the social structure
of advanced societies." Wacquant, The Penalisation of Poverty, supra note 216, at 401; cf
BECKET, supra note 86, at 7.
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its failures. The more policing and prosecution resembles an assembly line
that apprehends and punishes the poor with little regard for guilt and less for
"legal technicalities," the better it accords with and reflects its social control
function. The more violent and abusive the prison system becomes, the
more successfully it asserts its punitive function. And because it is focused
primarily on exclusion and trades so exclusively in the lives of the poor, the
contemporary criminal justice system also has an easier time hiding its
failures-an undertaking supported by the tendency to lump all criminals
and crimes into an undifferentiated category.2 42 For all these reasons, the
criminal justice system is much better able than the social welfare system to
retain its legitimacy in an age of crisis.
E. The Inexorable Logic of Social Control and the Rule of Law's Fate in
Modern Society
The elevation of the criminal justice system to a dominant role in the
social control of the lower classes is the most fundamental reason for the
rule of law's erosion in contemporary society and the reason, too, that this
process is so concentrated in the criminal justice context. This follows from
a very basic fact: that rule of law norms pose untenable impediments to the
implementation of the criminal justice system's expanding program of
social control. These norms are increasingly incompatible with a criminal
justice system that has inherited the social welfare system's mission of labor
control, class and labor discipline, and general protection of society from
the threats of disorder that follow from social marginality.
To be sure, Hayek, Unger, and others who argue the incompatibility of
the rule of law with the welfare state have a point. As we acknowledged
earlier, the welfare state does indeed require individualized rulemaking,
discretionary administration, and other policies that offend rule of law
norms. Overall, though, the encounter between the welfare state and the rule
of law remains, as it always has been, relatively benign. As we have also
seen, rule of law norms actually reached their apogee in American society
concurrent with the height of the welfare state. Undoubtedly, this reflects
the fact that gains in social equality achieved by the welfare state offset its
corrosive effects-the point made by Neumann. Perhaps more importantly,
the kind of sovereignty of which the welfare state consists is itself relatively
benign, typically entailing financial relationships and only rarely (even in its
242. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE
PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1997).
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current, often more punitive iterations) involving directly coercive acts on
the part of the state. In any case, the entire institution is in full retreat.
The rule of law's fate in the criminal justice context has been much more
problematic. Conventional attempts to explain this invariably focus on the
politics of law and order and race, on the juridical and moral failings of
judges, legislators, and other officials, and on the effects of epiphenomena
like the advent of crack cocaine and the war on terrorism. 2 3 Such accounts
are often apt reflections on the state of the criminal justice system and the
process by which it has retreated from its hard-won commitment (to rule of
law norms). Where they fail completely, though, is in grasping the
connection between the rule of law's erosion and the political economy of
contemporary society. They remain oblivious to how changes in this context
have altered the way the state articulates its social control functions and in
so doing, prefigures this erosion of rule of law norms. In fact, the rule of
law's tenuous condition in the criminal justice context reflects the basic fact
that the state's adherence to its normative program in this context is simply
incompatible with the increasingly important function of the criminal justice
system as an institution for regulating social marginality in an era of welfare
retrenchment. The shift of the criminal justice system away from rule of law
norms is simply a juridical reflection of the expanded, intensified
commitment to social control described in the last Section.
For example, asserting this social control agenda requires that the police
are able freely to threaten and intimidate the lower classes, to control their
movements in space and time, and generally to serve such people with
constant reminders of the limits of dissent, deviance, and non-compliance
with established norms. In order to do this, the police must be able to detain,
question, or arrest people without probable cause, and if need be, without
any legal authorization whatsoever. They must be able to collect evidence
on which criminal cases can be made with no regard for "technical"
violations of the law and no fear of its exclusion or their incurring legal
liability. And they must be free to resort to patently racist and class-coded
means of law enforcement, as well as extra-legal violence, without fear of
legal consequences.
To make this point a bit differently, when the police stop and search a
poor person's automobile in apparent violation of the Fourth or Fifth
Amendment, when they rough up some peaceful protestor, when they frame
some unemployed youth caught on the wrong side of town, it is not simply
because they are lazy or racist or ignorant, or because they are consciously
243. On this tendency, see, for example, COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 181-
212; ALLEN, supra note 181, at 57-93.
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opposed to constitutional rights or rule of law values. All of this is often
true, of course. But more fundamentally, when the police behave in these
ways it is because doing so, though always part of the police function, is
increasingly central to their role in contemporary society. Similarly, judicial
authorization of such behavior-though formalizing the affront to rule of
law norms-can be seen not merely as a misreading of doctrine or a failure
of judicial courage, but also as an acquiescence to the reality of policing in
the post-welfare world.
A similar explanation speaks to the position of contemporary
prosecutors, whose discharge of the criminal justice system's social control
function is dependent above all on the ability freely to prosecute, convict,
and punish without regard to legal culpability strictly construed, but rather
along the lines of more diffuse notions of who is a threat, a "bad guy," or
someone who just "doesn't respect the system." In order to convert the
criminal law's nominal commitment to public safety and moral retribution
into an agenda for enforcing compliance with social norms generally and
for doing so on the basis of class, race, and related indicia of marginality,
prosecutors must have prerogatives that are precisely at odds with the rule
of law: virtually unfettered discretion in plea bargaining and sentencing; the
ability to intimidate defendants with onerous sanctions, including the
prerogative to discriminate on the basis of class and race; the ability to use
bogus evidence against them; the ability to conceal evidence from
defendants; and a virtual guarantee that the defendants they face will lack
competent counsel with adequate resources at their disposal.
Likewise, the use of incarceration and other forms of criminal sanction to
control the poor is feasible only if retroactive sanctions are permitted,
sentences are generally quite harsh, and conditions of confinement,
including brutality by correctional officials, inmate violence, and
overcrowding, are not subject to much in the way of effective legal restraint.
These features of punishment are, among other things, essential to
preserving the principle of lesser eligibility in the face of the tremendous
uncertainties, the material deprivation, and the utter marginalization that
characterize lower class life. To put this another way, a regime of
punishment that did adhere to rule of law norms, committed to
prospectivity, proportionality, and official compliance with the law, simply
would not, in Hay's terms, sufficiently terrorize a population long
habituated to the meanest, most insecure existence, and yet expected to
accept this lot without resorting to crime or disorder.
These inherent disjunctions between the rule of law and the aggressive
prosecution of a social control agenda via the criminal justice system are
compounded by the massive expansion of the scale of criminal justice-
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which they of course help to create. There is no particular point at which a
sufficient number of poor people have been arrested, prosecuted, or
imprisoned to complete the agenda of social control. Indeed, as Garland
shows, part of the newly dominant "culture of control" is an irrational belief
that there can be no victory in the struggle against crime and disorder-that
the poor will never really accept their lot; that disorder and deviance are
always lurking. This leaves only fiscal constraints as evident impediments
to the relentless expansion of the criminal justice system. Perversely,
though, these limits have a much greater effect on the institutional integrity
and overall quality of the criminal justice system than on its overall size.
This leads to a dynamic in which the expansion of the criminal justice
system progressively reduces the very resources needed to achieve
compliance with the rule of law.2" Only recently and in the face of
enormous deficits has there been any sign that fiscal considerations might
begin to reign in the size of the criminal justice system.
V. CONCLUSION
To explain the demise of rule of law norms, as this Article does, in terms
of a shift in the dominant mode of social control, speaks to several
important issues. First, as anticipated at the outset, this argument calls into
question the dominant view of the welfare state as the most significant
impediment to the realization of rule of law norms. Instead, the welfare
state's retrenchment, intertwined as it is with the expansion and
intensification of social control functions in the criminal justice context, is
shown to give a greater account of this problem. Second, the argument
developed here speaks more broadly to the rule of law's dilemma in modem
society. The underlying challenge for the rule of law is to realize its norms
in the context of an enduring commitment on the part of the modem state to
respond to the problem of social marginality with an agenda of social
244. The system is progressively less able to provide adequate training to police, to
guarantee competent counsel to defendants, to keep the courts open to the offenders, to alleviate
overcrowding and inadequate security in prisons and jails, or to provide forums for the actual
vindication of any such rights. Worse, the effects of expanded costs are not borne equally
throughout the criminal justice system; instead they are imposed in accordance with a process of
the rationing of criminal justice resources. Resources are only relatively scarce, and only in a
thoroughly political sense, by which offenders and the accused consistently fare more poorly
than police, prosecutors, and the courts. This dynamic is especially evident, for example, in the
context of indigent defense. See, e.g., Rebecca Marcus, Note, Racism in Our Courts: The
Underfunding of Public Defenders and Its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 228, 233 (1994). See generally Darryl K. Brown, Rationing




control. That response may be more or less coercive, and more or less
corrosive of rule of law norms, but even in its softer, welfarist form, this
response inevitably runs afoul of those norms. It is for this reason, among
others, that this Article should hardly be taken as a call to resurrect the
welfare state. Not only does that project create significant, if more muted,
problems for the rule of law, but it is also, as we have seen, increasingly
untenable given the realities of capitalism and a political economy defined
by neo-liberalism and fiscal crisis.
What, then, can be done? Whether with welfare or prison, the state's
response to social marginality seems inevitable. The risks in the form of
unrestrained disorder and deviance are simply too great to expect it to do
nothing; and no other institution seems to fit the bill. This suggests that the
root problem for the rule of law-the real impediment to realizing its norms
in modem society-is the problem of social marginality. This phenomenon
must be substantially abolished for there to be any hope of achieving a
system of governance that does not systematically offend the rule of law.
And of course, as we have also seen, marginality does not drop out of the
sky; it has its origins in the class structure of contemporary society and in
the dynamics of exploitation that underlie this. Ironically, this realization
exposes capitalism itself-the rule of law's historical progenitor-as its
contemporary adversary. Can capitalism be transcended? The very thought
is utopian, of course, as it must contend with the same factors that have cast
the modest aims of the welfare state in an impossibly radical light. But
utopian or not, this perspective at least tests the viability of the rule of law
against the social reality in which we find ourselves. In this respect it is
vastly more realistic than the tendency to await the rule of law's salvation at
the hands of a more educated public, more enlightened legislators. and
administrators, more conscientious judges, or other captives of history.
830 [Ariz. St. L.J.
